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I. INTRODUCTION
The way in which Latin America views arbitration has
changed dramatically during the last ten years. This is shown, in-
ter alia, through the ratification by many Latin American coun-
tries of both the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards' and the 1975 Pan-
ama Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Ar-
bitration.' This change is further evidenced by recent develop-
ments in the Andean Pact3 and Colombia;4 new Brazilian draft
legislation on commercial arbitration;5 and legislative changes in
Peru,' Mexico, and Venezuela.7 The fact that these changes have
not gone unnoticed is evidenced by the widespread use of arbitral
clauses in contracts to which Latin American private and public
persons or entities are a party. The old idea that Latin American
countries are hostile to arbitration would seem, therefore, no
longer true. In fact, it is more accurate to say that Latin America
as a whole is sympathetic to arbitration. Nevertheless, many of the
present rules applicable to arbitration still need to be adapted to
this new trend. The purpose of this Article is to analyze the pre-
sent state of Latin American laws on arbitration in order to assess
1. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 [hereinafter New York Convention].
2. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975,
14 I.L.M. 339 [hereinafter Panama Convention].
3. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
4. See new Decree 2279 of 1989, entirely modifying the law governing arbitration and
infra note 47 and accompanying text. But see, infra note 164.
5. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
6. C6DIGO PROCEDIMIENTOS CIVILKS [C6D. PROc. CIv.] arts. 1906-1922 (Peru); Legislative
Decree No. 295 of July 24, 1984.
7. The new provisions regarding arbitration in the Mexican Commercial Code were in-
troduced in 1989. See infra note 10. As to Venezuela, see New Procedural Code, Gaceta
Ofical [G.O.] No. 3970 Extraordinario of Mar. 13, 1987 (as reformed) (original text at G.O.
No. 3694 Extraordinario of Jan. 22, 1986).
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the areas where legislative change is advisable.
Arbitration in Latin America must be studied from two differ-
ent vantage points: (1) the legal provisions in Latin American
countries regarding commercial arbitration and (2) the legal provi-
sions in Latin American countries which govern the recognition
and enforcement of arbitral awards rendered abroad.
II. REGULATIONS OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA
In Latin America there is no distinction between the rules that
govern domestic arbitration and those that control international
arbitration. In this regard, Latin American laws on arbitration re-
semble other recent arbitral legislation such as the Netherlands
1986 Arbitration Act,8 which does not discriminate between local
and international arbitrations. In Paraguay,9 Mexico, 0 and Colom-
bia,"' however, arbitral legislation contained in the procedural
codes does not apply when there exists an international treaty or
convention. This is an exception to the normal practice of applying
domestic legislation to arbitration, either domestic or interna-
tional. These countries ratified the 1975 Panama Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration. Arbitrations
taking place in such countries are thus governed by the arbitral
rules of the Inter-American Arbitration Commission unless the
parties to the arbitration have stipulated otherwise."2 Latin Ameri-
can doctrinal scholars have stressed, however, the need to draw a
distinction between cases subject to domestic procedural rules and
those which should not fall within the scope of these rules due to
their international nature." Often, this is considered a conse-
8. Netherlands Arbitration Act of July 2, 1986, 4 INT'L Com. ARB. release 87-1 (Jan.
1987). P. SANDERS & A. VAN DEN BERG, THE NETHERLANDS ARBITRATION AcT OF 1986 11-52
(1987); van den Berg, Report on the Netherlands, 13 Y.B, CoM. ARs. 3 (1987).
9. C6Dno PROCESAL CIVIL [COD. PROC. Civ.] art. 784 (Para.). Requiring that "except for
the provisions of international treaties," the arbitral tribunal must sit in Paraguay, must be
composed of Paraguayan residents, and the award must be rendered in Paraguay. See gen-
erally Ahrens & Samtleben, Schiedsgerichitsbarkeit in Paraguay, 9 RECHT DFR INTERNA-
TIONALEN WmTSCHAFT [R.I.W.J 721-26 (1990).
10. This principle is explicitly set out at New Article 1421, Mexican Commercial Code,
Decreto por el que se Reforma, Adiciona y Deroga Diversas Disposiciones del C6digo de
Commercio, DiAlo OFICIA d [D.O.], Jan. 3, 1989, at 3-9.
11. Decree 2279 of 1989, art. 48 (Colom.)[hereinafter Decree 2279].
12. See Panama Convention, supra note 2, at art. 3. However, the outcome is doubtful
when there is conflict between the public policy of the national law applicable to the arbi-
tration and the Arbitral Rules of the Inter-American Arbitral Commission.
13. See Grigera Na6n, El Arbitraje Comercial Internacional en America Latina, 4
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quence of the ratification of international conventions on arbitra-
tion by the country at issue."'
A. Legal and Equity Arbitration
Latin American countries, following the Continental Law tra-
dition, distinguish between "legal" arbitrators (de jure arbitrators)
and "equity arbitrators" or "amiable compositeurs" (ex aequo et
bono arbitrators).1 5 The decisions of "legal" arbitrators are strictly
grounded on existing law. If a choice-of-law problem arises, they
apply the private international law of the country in which the ar-
bitral panel is sitting. Nevertheless, national legal systems may
contemplate the use by arbitral tribunals of special conflict-of-laws
rules. For instance, according to the Mexican Commercial Code,
arbitrators shall apply the law chosen by the parties, unless such
election is invalid for public policy reasons. If there is no choice-of-
REVISTA DEL DERECHO INDUSTRIAL [REV. DE. INDus.] 1-21 (1980).
14. As to Uruguay: R. SANTOS BELANDRO, ARBrrRAJE COMERCIAL INrERNACIONAL 293
(1988). As to Chile: Le6n, Arbitraie Comercial en Chile, in EL ARDITRAjE EN EL DERECHO
LATINOAMERICANO Y ESPAtqOL (Liber Amicorum en Homenaje a L. Kos Rabcewicz Zubkow-
ski) 199-203 (1989) [hereinafter Liber Amicorum Zubkowski]. As to Colombia: Monroy
Cabra, El arbitraje internacional y el Derecho Colombiano, in Liber Amicorum Zubkowski,
supra, at 240-42. As to Honduras: Le6n G6mez, Ejecuci6n de ta Sentencia Arbitral en Hon-
duras, in Liber Amicorum Zubkowski, supra, at 349-350 (pointing out that prohibitions on
both the state and state entities to submit to arbitration under article 63 of the Ley del
Presupuesto General de Ingresos y Egresos of 1988 would not apply to international arbitra-
tions within the context of international conventions ratified by Honduras, such as the 1975
Panama Inter-American Convention).
15. Grigera Na6n, Report on Argentina, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITrrATION 1-2 (Supp. III 1985); Marotta Rangel, Report on Brazil, in 3 Y.B. CoM. AM. 31,
41 (1978); In Colombia, arbitrators may decide according to the strict rules of law (irbitros
de derecho) and ex aequo et bono ("en conciencia.") Under Colombian law, the "amigable
componedor" (another type of arbitrator) does not exactly perform arbitral functions. He is
normally called to resolve quality disputes through decisions which have the force of a con-
tract between the parties, but are deprived of procedural effects. Decree 2279, supra note
11, art. 6, at 49-52. Diaz Rubio, Report on Colombia, 3 Y.B. CoM. Aw. 58, 65 (1978). In
Ecuador, arbitrators acting under institutional arbitral rules only decide as ex aequo et
bono adjudicators. Ley de Arbitraje Comercial art. 15, Decree No. 735, RO No. 90, Oct. 28,
1963. In Ecuador, ad hoc arbitrators may decide either according to strict legal rules or ex
aequo et bono. Jim6nez Salazar, Report on Ecuador, 3 Y.B. COM. AiB. 76, 84, 89 (1978); C.
LuutoATEGm, CoN'TRmucl6N AL ESrUDIo DEL AMwrrRAiz PvADo 95-96 (1982). Mexico also
contemplates "legal" and "equity" arbitrators. Brisefio Sierra, Report on Mexico, in 3 Y.B.
COM. AM. 94, 102 (1978). The same is true in Peru. COD. PRoc. CIv. art. 568 (Peru). Bolivia:
(C6DIGo DE PROCEnDIMENTOS CIVIL [C6D PRoc. CIV.] arts. 712, 739 (Bol.) Uruguay: D. BAR-
RIOS DE ANOELIS, EL Juicio Awrr 186 (1956); Samtleben, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in Uru-
guay, 34 RIW 107, 108 (1978). Venezuela: Parra Aranguren, Report on Venezuela, 3 Y.B.




law provision or one is deemed invalid, the arbitrators shall deter-
mine the law to be applied to the dispute by taking into account
the characteristics and contacts of the dispute."6 In countries
which have ratified the 1975 Panama Inter-American Convention
on International Commercial Arbitration, arbitral tribunals hear-
ing international commercial disputes must observe, unless other-
wise agreed by the parties, the conflict-of-laws rules encapsulated
in article 33 of the Rules of the Inter-American Arbitration Com-
mission.1 7 In principle, legal arbitrators must observe the proce-
dural rules contemplated for normal court proceedings. This re-
quirement may be waived only if specific procedural provisions
governing arbitration are applicable, or if the parties decide other-
wise. Awards of legal arbitrators may be reviewed; however, the
parties are allowed to waive their right to appeal at the moment
they submit the terms of reference to the arbitrators (com-
promiso). It is debatable whether this waiver is possible upon sign-
ing of the arbitral agreement.'
In the following circumstances, recourse to set aside the award
may not be waived: when the arbitrator decides on points not sub-
mitted to arbitration, when the award is made beyond the deadline
agreed by the parties, or when the arbitrator makes an essential
procedural mistake. The various Latin American countries differ in
the way they deal with these situations.'9
16. C6D. CoM. art. 1426 (Mex.). For a discussion of this provision, see my forthcoming
article, Arbitration in Latin America With Special Regard to Mexico and Colombia, 4
J~aREUCH FOR DIE PRAXS DR SCHIEDSGRICHTSBARxKrr (1990).
17. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975,
art. 3, Organization of American States T.S. No. 42. This provision follows closely article 28
of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. However, as to possible limitations on the application
of such rules derived from the public policy of the law governing the arbitration, see infra
note 101 and corresponding text.
18. For a discussion on the compromiso or specific submission of an existing dispute,
required even if there is already an arbitral agreement, see infra notes 75-105 and corre-
sponding text.
In Argentina, however, the current opinion is that the parties may deal in advance with
the arbitral agreement and procedural matters concerning any arbitration thereunder. L.
PALACIO, 9 DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIw 49 (1988). Thus, though article 758 of the National
Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure authorizes waiver of the means of appeal against
an arbitral award at the compromiso, it should not be read as preventing such a waiver at
the prior stage of executing the arbitral agreement. C6DCO PROCESAL CIn. Y COMERCIAL DR
LA NACI6N [C6D. PROC. Civ. Y COM.] art. 758 (Argen.).
19. In Argentina, article 760 of the National Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure
applies to legal arbitrators and also states that the right to ask the arbitral tribunal to clar-
ify an obscure point in the award cannot be waived. C6D. PRoc. Civ. v CohL art. 760 (Argen.).
In Brazil, article 1100 of the Procedural Code, mentions the following grounds for set-
ting aside: (i) the nullity of the submission agreement; (ii) the failure to decide all points
1991]
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Equity arbitrators are not bound to apply the strict rule of
submitted to the arbitral decision; (iii) the designation of arbitrators in a way incompatible
with legal or contractual rules; or (iv) the rendering of an ex aequo et bono decision when
the arbitrators have not been authorized to do so in the compromiso. C6DIGO DO PROCESSO
CiVIL [C.P.C.] art. 1100 (Braz.). The means for setting aside are not introduced against the
award itself but against the Brazilian Court decision which "homologated" or confirmed the
award. Marotta Rangel, supra note 15, at 43. Awards are not subject to appeal unless the
parties provide otherwise. C6DIGo COMERCIAL [C.Co.] art. 1041 (Braz.). However, the means
for setting aside under article 1100 of the Procedural Code cannot be waived. C.P.C. art.
1100 (Braz.).
In Chile, violation of certain formal requirements, such as making an award beyond the
scope of the compromiso, may be corrected by introducing a recourse of'cassation. Appeal is
also possible with respect to arbitral awards but it may be waived. However, recourse of
cassation concerning the substance is not waivable with respect to the awards of "equity
arbitrators," unless express stipulation of the parties allows for the filing of an appeal with
another arbitral tribunal. Equity awards are also free from appeal. C6DGO ORGANIco DE
TrIBUNALES [C6D Oao. Tam.] art. 239 (Chile). Abuses and mistakes of the arbitrators may
also be corrected through "recurso de queja." Eyzaguirre Echeverria, Report on Chile, 3 Y.B.
COM. ARB. 45, 56 (1978).
In Colombia, no appeal of an arbitral award is possible, though the award may be cor-
rected in the case of obscurity by the arbitral tribunal. See Decree 2279, supra note 11, art.
36. Setting aside the award is possible in the following cases: (a) if the arbitral agreement is
null and void; (b) if the arbitral tribunal's constitution is vitiated; (c) if the defendant has
not received personal notice of the initiation of arbitral proceedings; (d) if no opportunity
was available in the course of arbitral proceedings for producing evidence or to allege on the
evidence produced; (e) if the award is made after expiration of the deadline therefor; (f) if
the award was made ex aequo et bono when it should have been made in accordance with
the law; (g) if the award shows clerical errors or contradictory decisions; (h) if the award
decides issues not subject to arbitration or is made extra petita; or (i) if the award fails to
decide issues submitted to arbitration; and the court decision regarding the setting aside of
the award may be further subject to cassation before the Colombian Supreme Court when,
inter alia, it infringes a substantive law provision, it is not congruous with the facts, plead-
ings, or defenses alleged or raised by the parties or which the judge should have taken into
account ex officio, or contains contradictory reasoning or rulings. Id. arts. 38-41; C6D. PROC.
Civ. art. 368 (Colom.). In exceptional cases, such as when arbitration proceedings are viti-
ated by fraud, a special extraordinary means of recourse for revising the award is available
within two years after the date the award became enforceable. Decree 2279, supra note 11,
art. 41; C6D. PRoc. Civ. arts. 380-381 (Colom.).
In Ecuador, arbitral awards rendered in arbitrations within the framework of the
Chambers of Commerce are not subject to appeal or action to set aside. Nevertheless, they
may be clarified or corrected by the arbitral tribunal if so requested by any of the parties
within three days of the date they are made. Ley de Arbitraje Comercial art. 17. Doctrinal
opinions criticize this solution and contend that a means for setting aside the award should
be available. C. LARREATFEGUI, supra note 15, at 192-93. Ad hoc arbitration is subject to
appeal and setting aside. While means of appeal may be waived, the action for setting aside
(i) on account of nullity of the submission or compromiso; (ii) because the award was made
beyond the terms of the submission or not all the arbitrators took part in the making of the
award; (iii) because the award was made after the expiration of the deadline therefore; or
(iv) because the jurisdiction of the arbitrators has ceased, cannot be waived or excluded.
Jim6nez Salazar, supra note 15, at 86-93.
In Mexico, appeals of the award are not excluded by the arbitration agreement. C6DIGO
FEDERAL DE PROCEDIMIENTOS CIVILES [C.F.P.C] art. 619 (Mex.); C6D. CoM. art. 1432 (Mex.).
An award may be set aside if it violates public policy. Briseflo Sierra, supra note 15, at 104.
208
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law. Instead, they must decide the dispute in an equitable manner
based on their notions of justice. They may disregard imperative
norms and need not show allegiance to abstract rules in finding a
solution to the case. However, they cannot ignore or fail to apply
both public policy principles and norms which protect the interests
of the community.
20
Generally, equitable awards are not subject to any means of
recourse. Nevertheless, they may be set aside if they were based on
matters not submitted to arbitration, or if the decision was handed
down after the agreed upon deadline expired.21 Some countries do
In Paraguay, an arbitral award from "legal" arbitrators is subject to the same right of
appeal as ordinary court decisions. However, the parties may waive this right. Nevertheless,
if an award was made beyond the deadline it cannot be waived or the formal requirements
have not been complied with. C6D PROC. Civ. arts. 813-815 (Pars.).
In Peru, awards from "legal" arbitrators are appealable, unless the means of recourse
have been waived at the compromiso. C6D. PROC. Civ. art. 570 (Peru). The appeal cannot be
waived if the award was made beyond the deadline, decided on matters not defined in the
compromiso, if the award holds contradictory decisions, or if it involves substantial proce-
dural errors. Id. art. 571; cf., U. MONTOYA ALBRR'r, EL AnBrrRAiE CoMRRcImAL 117-21 (1988).
In Bolivia, an award from "legal" arbitrators is subject to the same means of recourse
contemplated for court decisions but may be waived at the compromiso. C6D. PROC. Civ. art.
231 (Bol.). However, the means of recourse to obtain a clarification of the award, to allege
that it was pronounced on matters not contemplated in the submission, was given after the
deadline or decided matters not submitted to the arbitral jurisdiction, or introduced because
the arbitral tribunal committed an essential procedural error, cannot be excluded by the will
of the parties. C6D. PRoc. Civ. art. 733 (Bol.).
In Uruguay, arbitral awards can be set aside if pronounced after expiration of the dead-
line, when dealing with issues not submitted to arbitration, or because the arbitrator refused
to accept the production of evidence offered by the parties. C6D. PROC. Civ. art. 570 (Uru.).
In Venezuela, legal arbitral awards may be subject to appeal only if the parties specifi-
cally provided at the compromiso that the award may be subject to appeal. Equitable
awards are not subject to appeal. However, both equitable and "legal" awards may be set
aside if pronounced as a result of a null and void compromiso, if the award contains contra-
dictions preventing its enforcement, if it does not resolve all the disputed issues contained
in the compromiso, if it resolves issues not contemplated therein, or if essential procedural
errors have been committed in the course of arbitral proceedings. C6D. Psoc. Civ. arts. 624,
626 (Venez.); F. GABALD6N, supra note 15, at 118-46.
A general perusal of Latin American legislations indicates that both an appeal and ac-
tion to set aside an award may be introduced in regard to a final award, but not with respect
to interim or preliminary decision or other decision of the arbitral tribunal not terminating
arbitral proceedings. As to Venezuela, see F. GABALD6N, supra, note 15, at 77. As to Argen-
tina, see 9 L. PALACIO, supra note 18, at 126-27, 152. As to Paraguay, see C6D. PROC. Civ.
art. 813 (Para.).
20. Grigera Na6n, El Arbitraje Comercial Internacional en America Latina, 4 RZv.
Dmi. INDus. 1, 5-6 (1980).
21. Argentina: C6D. PROC. Civ. v Com. art. 771 (Argen.). In Argentina, the setting aside
of an equitable arbitral award may not be obtained by pleading that the award reaches an
unjust solution to the case. Judgment of July 24, 1959, Cimara Nacional de Apelaciones en
Ia Comercial de la Capital Federal, Argen., 96 L.L. 282. Bolivia: C61. PRoC. Civ. art. 745
(Bol.). In Peru, the same means of recourse that may be raised against a legal award can
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not distinguish between the grounds available for setting aside le-
gal as opposed to equitable arbitral awards.22 Many countries sim-
ply establish that identical grounds are available for both types of
arbitration.
According to the legislation and case law of most Latin Ameri-
can countries, a legal or equitable arbitral award may be reversed
when contrary to public policy. This is achieved through a special
means of recourse available against an otherwise final court deci-
sion which upheld the validity of a vitiated arbitral award. In the
case of Argentina, this special means of recourse is to be filed with
the Supreme Court of Justice.23 In Mexico, it is embodied in the
Writ of Amparo. This writ is available when the violation involves
essential due process guarantees that can be directly raised against
an arbitral award rendered by court-appointed arbitrators.2 4 The
Writ of Amparo can also be raised against the decision to set aside
an award. In the case of Colombia, the recurso extraordinario de
revisi6n can be directly raised against the arbitral award in the
superior court of the judicial circuit where the arbitral tribunal is
located. This extraordinary means of recourse may also be raised
with the Colombian Supreme Court, if it is addressed against a
superior court sentence which decided on the means of recourse to
set aside the award.
25
In some Latin American countries, unless the parties have oth-
erwise provided, it is presumed that arbitrators shall decide as
"amiable compositeurs."' 6 Chile accepts a third category of
"mixed" arbitrators, who are placed half-way between legal and
equitable arbitration. Under Chilean law, mixed arbitrators are not
bound by the procedural rules applicable to court proceedings;
however, the substance of their award must follow the strict rules
also be used against an equitable award. They cannot, however, be waived by the parties.
C6D. PROC. art. 573 (Peru).
22. This appears to be the case in Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Mexico.
For Ecuador, this applies to ad hoc arbitration.
23. Law 48, art. 14; Judgment of Apr. 24, 1990, CAmara Nacional en lo Comercial "D,"
Argen. - E.D. 2-3, advance sheet (April 24, 1990).
24. C.P.D.F. art. 635; C6DIGo CIVM PAA zL DisTmrro FEERAL [C.C.D.F.] arts. 8 and 1830
(Mex.); Hoagland, Modification of Mexican Arbitration Law, 7 J. INT'L AIm. 91, 97 (1990).
25. See Decree 2279, supra note 11, art. 41. For further detail on this means of re-
course, see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
26. Argentina: C6D. PROC. Civ. v COM. art. 766 (Argen.). Bolivia: C6D. Paoc. Crv. art. 739
(Bol.). Ecuador: C6DIGO PRocasAL CivWi [C6D. PROC. Civ.] art. 1016 (Ecuador) (as to ad hoc
arbitration); see also Jimbnez Salazar, supra note 15, at 90. Uruguay: C6D. PROC. CIv. art.
534 (Uru.). Venezuela: C6D. Paoc. Civ. art. 618(3) (Venez.).
[Vol. 22:2-3
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of law. Mixed arbitrators are empowered, like equitable arbitra-
tors, to shape the arbitral procedure at their discretion. Neverthe-
less, they must decide the dispute as legal arbitrators would.1
7
B. Arbitration and State Parties
As a rule, matters which may not be subject to compromise or
settlement may not be submitted to arbitration.2 8 This rule applies
to family law questions (e.g., personal status, affiliation, divorce,
and inheritance), which are not fundamentally concerned with pat-
rimonial aspects, and to certain areas where private adjudication
would not be advisable for public policy reasons. The latter cate-
gory does not seem to preclude a state entity, or the state itself,
from becoming a party to local or international arbitration pro-
ceedings. However, the state or a state entity will most likely be
prevented from submitting to arbitration (local or foreign) if the
arbitrator would be passing judgment on the exercise of sovereign
state power or if his decision would interfere with public organiza-
tion of the state, public policy, or state authority.29 These restric-
27. R. EYZAGUiRRE ECHEVERRIA, EL ARBITRAJE COMERCIAL EN LA LEGISLACI6N CHILENA Y
su REGULACI6N INTERNACIONAL 21 (1981) [hereinafter AnriTrAMu COMECIAL].
28. Argentina: C6D. PROC. Civ. Y COM. art. 737 (Argen.). Bolivia: CO. PROC. Civ. art. 712
(Bol.). Brazil: C.P.C. arts. 1072, 1094 (Braz.). Colombia: Decree 2279, supra note 11. In Co-
lombia, matters concerning patents and trademarks may not be submitted to arbitration.
Dlaz Rubio, supra note 15, at 60. In Peru, matters relating to personal status and capacity,
property belonging to the state, municipalities, and public or state entities, and matters
affecting general morality are not subject to arbitration. State entities may submit to arbi-
tration disputes concerning such property if authorized by the government through "Resolu-
ci6n Suprema." They may also submit their contracts to arbitration with prior knowledge of
the "Contraloria General de Ia Repiblica." C6D. Civ. art. 1913 (Peru); C6D. PROC. Civ. art.
549 (Peru). In general, penal disputes, bankruptcy proceedings, and matters which cannot
be subject to a compromise or settlement by the parties cannot be submitted to arbitration
under Peruvian law. Montoya Alberti, supra note 19, at 52-56. Chile excludes from arbitra-
tion the division of matrimonial property, support obligations, and all cases where the At-
torney General is to be heard and matters between the guardian and the person subject to
guardianship. Labor relations, criminal matters, and disputes involving jurisdiction and
competence are also excluded from arbitration. C6D. ORo. Tam. art. 229 (Chile); Eyzaquirre
Echeverria, supra note 19, at 47-48. Ecuador accepts arbitration under the Ley de Arbitraje
Comercial, solely referring to arbitration under the Chambers of Commerce, on all commer-
cial matters excepting trademarks, bankruptcy, and dissolution of a partnership or com-
pany. The general rule, however, is that only matters which cannot be compromised cannot
be arbitrated. Jim6nez Salazar, supra note 15, at 79; C. LARREATEGUI M., supra note 15, at
85-86. In Mexico, no arbitration is possible in family law, personal status, inheritance, and
criminal matters. Briseflo Sierra, supra note 15, at 97.
29. Argentina: M. MARIENHOFF, III-A TRATADO DE DMaOcao ADMINISTRATIVO 602 (1983);
Argentine Supreme Court of Justice, Cia. Italo Argentina de Electricidad, Fallos 178-293;
R. Bullrich, La Naturaleza Juridica de la Concesion de Servicios Publicos y la Jurisdiccibn
212 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:2-3
tions may also preclude arbitration in the field of administrative
contracts, to the extent the arbitral tribunal would be entitled to
restrain the exercise of the state's power to unilaterally modify or
terminate the contractual relationship, or to otherwise affect state
sovereignty or authority. Notwithstanding the foregoing, arbitra-
tion of factual issues, such as the assessment of the amount of in-
demnity to be paid to a private party in case of breach, seems pos-
sible in regard to administrative contracts.
3 0
Competente para Interpretar sus Cidusulas, 51 J.A. 17, 22, 23, 41-42 (1935); Chmara Fed-
eral de la Capital, Gobierno Nacional v. Puerto de San Nicolds (S.A.), 1946-Il J.A. 154-55
(Deciding, in a domestic case, that issues concerning an expropriation responding to public
interest reasons cannot be submitted to arbitration); Supreme Court of Justice, Schmidt,
F.H. (S.A.) (empresa constructora) v. Prov. de San Juan, 1938-63 J.A. 368-74 (rejecting, in
domestic case, the jurisdiction of arbitrators to decide the validity of a provincial state con-
tract when the validity depends on the constitutionality of the provincial law authorizing
such contract); Clamara Federal de Ia Capital, Cia del Dock Sud de Bs. As. Ltda. v.
Gobierno Nacional, 1943-IV J.A. 606-08 (preventing an arbitral tribunal from deciding on
the validity of a governmental decree that instructed the private contractor to leave a free
area for public use at both sides of the channel built under the concession agreement).
Chile: ARnrRA= COMEaaCAL, supra note 27, at 334-37. Brazil: On November 14, 1973, the
Supreme Federal Tribunal, in its Organizacao Lage decision, held that the federal state may
submit to arbitration with the exception of transactions where it acts as a public (sovereign)
authority. This exception is based on the principle that sovereign powers may not be subject
to compromise and are therefore excluded from arbitration. Marotta Rangel, supra note 15,
at 34; de Magalhaes, Do Eatado no Arbitragem Privada, in ARErroAGEM ComEaciAi 76-81
(J.C. de Magalhaes & L.O. Baptiste eds. 1986). In Paraguay, C6DIO PROCESAL CrMi art
774 excludes from arbitration disputes relating to public or municipal property or for any
reason requiring the intervention of the public attorney (Ministerio Fiscal). Peru: With the
exception of international loans or international treaties the Peruvian state or state enter-
prises organized under Peruvian public law are allowed to submit to arbitral tribunals sit-
ting in Peru. This excludes arbitration abroad. CONSTITUCION POLMCA DEL PERU art. 136;
Aramburu Menchaca, International Commercial Arbitration in the Andean Pact, in THE
ART OF ARBITRATION, LraEa AMiCORUM 31 (P. Sanders ed. 1982). However, state enterprises
organized under private law rules may submit to foreign arbitration. U. MONTOYA ALEERTi,
supra note 19, at 74-78. Uruguay excludes from arbitration disputes to which the public
attorney (ministerio fiscal) must be a party. CbD. PROC. CIV. art. 550 (Uru.). Venezuela ex-
cludes foreign arbitration with respect to contracts of public interest. G. Parra Aranguren,
supra note 15, at 137. Though arbitration might be possible with regard to administrative
contracts, the governing arbitral rules should be necessarily those contemplated in the Ven-
ezuelan Procedural Code, and this would exclude arbitration under the rules of the ICC. C.
LARREATEGUI, supra, note 15, at 83. Article 2 of C6digo de Procedimiento Civil excludes the
possibility of agreeing on the jurisdiction of foreign courts or of arbitrators sitting abroad in
regard to disputes concerning immovables located in the territory of Venezuela or on mat-
ters affecting public policy or public morality. According to the Introductory Remarks (Ex-
posici6n de Motivos) to the C6digo de Procedimiento Civil, only choice of forum stipulations
excluding the existing jurisdiction of Venezuelan Courts with respect to disputes between
foreigners or between a foreigner and a Venezuelan national not domiciled in Venezuela
would be compatible with Venezuelan public policy. R. HENRIQuEz LA ROCHE, COMENTARIOS
A.L NuEvo C6DIGO DR PROCEDMImENO Civw. 3 (1988).
30. Argentina: M. MARIMNHOFF, supra note 29, at 602-03; Grigera Na6n, El Estado y el
Arbitraje Internacional Con Particulares, 11-Ill REViSTA JRuIDIcA DE BUENos Ansas 127-64
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1. Foreign Arbitration and International State Contracts
The issues discussed above are also relevant in the area of for-
eign arbitration. For example, consider the arbitrator sitting
abroad who may believe he/she is entitled to ignore the laws of the
state which is a party to the administrative contract. Since these
laws regulate such things as the conditions under which the state
may validly contract, the powers of the state vis-A-vis the private
party, and the conditions under which such powers may be unilat-
erally exercised, it is unlikely that an arbitral clause empowering a
foreign arbitral tribunal to adjudicate such issues would be
recognized."1
(1989). At present, the Argentine state oil company YPF (Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales)
accepts submission to arbitration of any technical disputes arising out of service contracts
with private parties for hydrocarbon exploration and development in Argentina. "Technical
disputes" are understood as those whose resolution substantially depends on the determina-
tion of facts or circumstances related to a specific art or profession. Here, the parties choose
a single arbitrator, and in case of disagreement, each party selects one arbitrator and the
arbitrators so designated appoint the third arbitrator. If they fail to select a third arbitrator,
one is appointed by the President of the Argentine Supreme Court. The arbitrators must be
technically qualified to resolve the dispute and make their decision ex aequo et bono. The
award is not subject to appeal. If the place of arbitration is not designated in the arbitration
agreement, it is established at the compromiso. The arbitration will be governed by the rules
set out at the Argentine National Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure. See Model Con-
tract for the Exploration and subsequent Exploitation of Hydrocarbons, art. 18.3, DECRETO
623, 47-C ANALES DE LEGISLACI6N ARGENTINA [A.D.L.A.] 2273 (Argen.); DECRETO 1443, 45-C
A.D.LA. 2080 (Argen.).
31. In Argentina, it is also held that arbitral clauses in state contracts (providing for
arbitration in Argentina or abroad) are not valid if the disputed issue is governed by (i)
federal laws (including laws of general economic, financial, institutional, or political interest
and laws concerning national services or activities, enacted pursuant to article 67 of the
Argentine Constitution, but excluding general legislation and codes made by Congress under
article 67(11)), L. PALAclo, 2 DERECHO PROCESAL CivEL 477-79, (1979); (ii) Argentine Consti-
tutional provisions; or (iii) international treaties, because in such cases Argentine federal
courts would have exclusive jurisdiction under article 100 of the Argentine Constitution.
J.M. GONDRA, JURISDICCI6N FEDERAL 25-30 (1944); G. BIDART CAMPOS, EL DERECHO CONSTI-
TUCIONAL DEL PODER 365-67 (1967); G. BIDART CAMPOS, MANUAL DE DERECHO CONSTITU-
CIONAL ARGENTINo 795-96 (1980). However, the power of federal courts to exclude arbitra-
tion with respect to state contracts only exists when the claim is centrally grounded on
constitutional law, federal law, or treaty provisions. D. LASCANO, JURISDICCION Y COM-
PETENCIA 353-56 (1941).
A delicate issue arises whenever a state, having entered into an arbitral agreement,
challenges its validity on the ground that it was made in violation of its public laws. Article
177 (2), chapter 12 of the new Swiss Federal law of Private International Law expressly
denies a state or a state entity the power to invoke its national legislation before the arbitra-
tor or the courts under such a scenario. Though this provision explicitly refers to the case
where the state or a state entity claims lack of capacity or the non-arbitrability of the dis-
pute under its own laws, it may also be read as encompassing instances where the state
alleges that the public official or body participating in the execution of the arbitral agree-
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In so far as a foreign arbitrator could refuse to apply, as indi-
cated above, public laws to essential issues affecting state sover-
eignty, it is unlikely that foreign arbitration of a state contract can
be, or has been, used in Bolivia,3 2 Argentinas Peru,"4 Brazil,35
ment was not empowered to do so under the state's public laws. Gaillard, A Foreign View of
the New Swiss Law on International Arbitration, 4 Aia. INT'L 25 (1988). Literally speaking,
the state cannot allege a manifest violation of its constitutional laws in the making of an
arbitral agreement, if it affects an obviously non-arbitrable area or if it was obtained
through criminal conduct punishable under the state's penal laws. It is submitted that an
unqualified application of this provision is more likely to discourage than to favor arbitra-
tion. Taking the example of the Argentine administrative law, it is clear that the capacity
and power of the state to enter into legal transactions or to issue administrative acts is
exclusively governed by Argentine public law. An action of a public official or public body
beyond the scope of its powers, or in violation of such law's administrative or constitutional
provisions, is not valid. This rule recognizes certain exceptions if the lack of validity results
from the failure to comply with internal administrative procedures unknown to the other
party, or if the defects of the challenged state act are merely formal in nature. Since the
doctrine of estoppel is also accepted in Argentina, even invalid acts to which the state is a
party might be exceptionally upheld if, after weighing the public and private interests at
stake, it is concluded that the former are not considerably damaged. H. MAiRAL, LA Doc-
TRINA DE LOS PROPIOS AcTos Y LA ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA 52-61, 77-82 (1988). Nonetheless,
the new Swiss legislation, which rejects, ab initio, the application of state laws challenging
the arbitral agreement, also dismisses the fundamental state law conceptions aimed at strik-
ing a reasonable balance between the public and private interests involved. Because the
application of public laws in this regard may not be contracted out by the state, the state
will regard foreign arbitration with suspicion unless the state is reasonably assured that the
arbitral tribunal will take these principles into account when ruling on its own competence.
32. For example, article 13 of the contract for the sale of gas between Gas del Estado
(Argentina) and Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos (Bolivia) dated July 23, 1968
provides for ad hoc arbitration under rules to be chosen by the parties at the "compromiso."
The seat of the arbitration will be also established in the "compromiso." In case of a disa-
greement between the arbitrators chosen by each party, a third arbitrator will be designated
by one of the following officials in descending order of priority: (1) the President of Pe-
tr6leos Mexicanos (Pemex); (2) the President of the French Petroleum Institute; or (3) the
President of the American Arbitration Association (if the appointing authority ranking
before in the sequence indicated above fails to make such designation).
33. Na6n & Samtleben, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in Argentinien, 10 RIW 721-31 (1983).
34. Aramburu Menchaca, Report on Peri, 3 Y.B. CoM. Ass. 120-21 (1978); Montoya
Alberti, Arbitration, Foreign Law and Jurisdiction in International Loan Agreements in
Some Countries of Latin America, in ARBrrRATION IN SErLEMErr OF INTERNATIONAL COM-
MERCIAL DISPuTEs INVOLVING THE FAR EAST AND ARBITRATION IN COMBINED TRANSPORTATION
99-110 (P. Sanders ed. 1988). Peruvian public and private entities agreed with Japanese
corporations in order to finance the development of oil resources in Peru and the sale of
Peruvian oil to Japan. Agreements on Development and Supply of Petroleum, Aug. 28, 1974,
Japan-Peru, 15 I.L.M. 1245. Article XVII of the contract for the sale of petroleum, provides
that all ensuing disputes will be resolved under ICC arbitration in London. It is also stipu-
lated that the third arbitrator, which is appointed by the ICC court of arbitration, cannot be
Japanese or Peruvian nor have financial interests in oil operations.
35. Samtleben, Arbitration in Brazil, 18 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 12 (1986);
Strenger, International Arbitration: Doctrine and Practice in Brazil, 5 J. INT'L ARB. 44
(1988); J. DR MAGALHAEs, Do EsTADo NA ARBITRAGEM PRIVADA 65-72, 106-17 (1988).
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Mexico,se Chile, 7 Uruguay,' and Venezuela. 9 In these countries,
arbitration has been used in the context of international contracts
to which the state or a state entity is a party. These contracts may
involve financing, insurance, equipment, or commodity acquisition
and sale. In addition, Peru has recently modified its constitution to
allow arbitration clauses in international loan agreements to which
Peru or its state entities are parties. " In Ecuador, the constitution
prohibits the state or state entities from agreeing to foreign arbi-
tration. The state is also forbidden from submitting to the jurisdic-
tion of foreign courts in cases involving contracts to which the
state is a party, or where the public interest is concerned. These
provisions, however, have been interpreted as being inapplicable to
contracts concluded outside of Ecuador.41 In Panama, decentral-
ized state entities may submit "jure gestionis" transactions to arbi-
tration. The central state may submit to arbitration with the ap-
proval of the President, the Cabinet, and the Solicitor of the
National Treasury (Procurador General de la Naci6n). If these re-
quirements are fulfilled, the state is entitled to submit to interna-
tional arbitration disputes of patrimonial nature with foreign par-
ties arising out of international transactions.42
36. Brisefio Sierra, supra note 15, at 97.
37. Article 1, Decree-Law No. 2349 of October 13, 1978. Chilean law declares the valid-
ity of certain clauses inserted in international contracts to which the state or a public entity
is a party. These principally concern commercial or financial transactions or operations. Ar-
ticle 1(2) includes within the authorize'i clauses arbitral agreements which provide for arbi-
tration abroad. DiAio OFicL DE LA REPUBLICA DE CHILE [D.O.] No. 30.201, Oct. 28, 1978, at
4057-60; 1 Rev. DER. INDUS. 449 (1979); ARBnrTRE ComERciAL, supra note 27, at 316-17, 322,
326-27.
38. C. LARREexrGuI, supra note 15, at 82.
39. Article 127 of the Constitution of Venezuela provides Venezuelan courts with exclu-
sive jurisdiction in all public interest agreements made by the government with foreign enti-
ties, except where inappropriate given the nature of the contract. LA CONSTTucI6N DE 1961
art. 127 (Venez.). A 1974 Attorney General opinion indicated that loan agreements are pri-
vate contracts not encompassed by article 127. 4 LeAv, THE CALvo DOCTRINE IN LATIN
AmzRicAN LoANs 31, 34 (1985).
40. CONsTrmuCI6N POLITICA DEL PERu art. 136. For a discussion of the situation in Latin
American countries, see generally, Samtleben, CLiusulas de Jurisdiccibn y Legislaci6n Apli-
cable en los Contratos de Endeudamiento Externo de los Estados Latinoamericanos, 21
VERFASSUNG UND REcHT IN UBaRsee (LAW AND POL. IN AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA) 305-26
(1988).
41. Jimbnez Salazar, supra note 15, at 79. Article 16 of the Constitution of Ecuador
provides that contracts executed in Ecuador between the state or state entities and foreign
parties must be subject to the jurisdiction of national courts. As a consequence, submission
to a foreign jurisdiction, including arbitral tribunals, would be possible only if the contract
were executed abroad. LA CONSTrruC16N POLrITCA DE 1978 art. 16 (Ecuador); C. LAR-
RzATzoUi, supra note 15, at 78-79.
42. Boutin, De la Teorfa de la Doble Personalidad del Estado y el Arbitraje Interna-
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Legislation in Chile," ' Colombia, 4 Brazil,"' and Argentina 6 ex-
pressly allows the state to submit international loan agreements to
arbitration abroad. In some cases (as in Colombia), legislation only
allows this possibility when the loan contract is performed
abroad.47 In Argentina, it is required that the loan agreement be an
cional en el Nuevo Cbdigo Judicial Panamefto, in Liber Amicorum Zubkowski, supra note
14, at 459-72.
43. ARBrrEAJE ComsRciAL, supra note 27. The state or public entities need an authori-
zation from the President of the Republic (through a decree of the Ministry of Economy) to
agree on an international arbitration clause. This authorization does not apply to the Cen-
tral Bank of Chile or to the State Bank of Chile. Samtleben, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in
Chile, 29 RIW 167, 171 n.69 (1983) [hereinafter Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit].
44. Colombian Decree 222 of Feb. 2, 1983 art. 229. See English text at 2 News and
Notes of the Institute for Transnational Arbitration 3 (1987).
45. Le No. 1518, 15 LEX 510 (Brazil); Decreto Le No. 1.312, 38 LEx 564 (Braz.); de
Magalhaes, supra note 29, at 79; Samtleben, supra note 35, at 12. In international loan
agreements to which Brazil is a party, the Brazilian government usually submits itself to
foreign arbitration. The panel is composed of three arbitrators, one selected by each party
and the third by the arbitrators already designated. If there is no agreement about the
third's designation, the appointment is made by the President of the World Bank. If the
latter fails to do so, the designation is made by the President or any Vice-President of the
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators in London. The third arbitrator must be "a practicing
member of the bar of the state of New York." Though this is obviously an ad hoc arbitra-
tion device, arbitral proceedings compatible with the loan agreement are governed by arti-
cles 41-43 (powers of the arbitral tribunal, applicable law, powers to collect evidence), article
45 (ex parte arbitral proceedings), and articles 47-48 (interim measures of protection, arbi-
tral award) of the ICSID Convention. Arbitrators decide according to the chosen law, New
York law, and not as amiable compositeurs. Actually, Brazil accepts arbitration clauses in its
international loan transactions because the submission to a foreign state court is considered
a submission to a foreign sovereignty preciuded by the public policy reservation incorpo-
rated in article 17 of the Preliminary Law to the Brazilian Civil Code. Ruiz del Rio, Arbitra-
tion Clauses in International Loans, 4 J. INT'L Aim. 45, 56-58 (1987). See also Clare, En-
forcement of the Arbitration Clause in Brazilian Loan Agreements, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Nov.
1982, at 18-23.
46. Article 7 of Law 20548 (reforming article 48 of Law 16432) authorizes Argentina to
accept foreign arbitration clauses inserted in international loan agreements. Ley 20.548, 33D
kD.LA. 3657. The existence of a special law granting this type of authorization with regard
to contracts of jure gestionis nature is explained by the existence of an old decree of De-
cember 15, 1933. That decree forbids all state instrumentalities to enter into local or foreign
arbitration clauses both in private and administrative state contracts. Also, certain Supreme
Court decisions require that the submission to arbitration by the state be authorized
through a specific law. Judgment of November 1942, C.J.N., 194 Fallos 155. However, other
Supreme Court decisions have held that the executive branch may authorize, through a de-
cree, the insertion of an arbitral clause in a contract to which the state is a party. Bidart
Campos, La Jurisdicci6n Federal, 18 E.D. 511, 525; see Cia Italo, 178 Fallos at 293.
47. A recent Colombia Supreme Court decision upheld the constitutionality of this pro-
vision, see supra note 44. Corte Suprema de Justicia (Sala Plena), Expediente No. 1463,
Jorge Quintero Aguirre, Demanda de Inconstitucionalidad contra el Articulo 239, Decreto
Ley 222 de 1983 decision of October 20, 1986. See 2 News and Notes from the Institute of
Trannational Arbitration 1, 3 (1987); Pechota, Developments in Foreign and Comparative
Laws, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 777, 783-84 (1987). A prior decision in March 1986 had
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international transaction.'6 The governing principle in most Latin
American countries appears to be that if the state contracts as a
private person (jure gestionis), foreign arbitration is possible.
2. Foreign Adjudication and Public Policy Concerns
Certain issues have been traditionally excluded from foreign
adjudication-not just from foreign arbitration-because it is felt
that the public interest is closely concerned. An example of this is
found in Andean Pact Decision 24, article 51, which excluded for-
eign investment and foreign transfer of technology contracts from
the jurisdiction of foreign courts, arbitral tribunals, and from the
application of foreign laws.' 9 However, Decision 24 has recently
been superseded by Decision 220 of May 11, 1987, which does not
declared article 3 of Legislative Decree 3614 of 1985 unconstitutional. This decree had al-
lowed the enforcement of loan agreements (granted after the eruption of the volcano "del
Ruiz") to be controlled by-the law and jurisdiction chosen by the parties. Leavy, Court Puts
Foreign Loans in Danger, INT'L FIN. L. REv. 7-8 (1986). In its new decision, the Colombian
Supreme Court clearly states that contrary to Decree 3614 (which permitted the perform-
ance of foreign loan agreements in Colombia to be subjected to foreign courts or arbitrators)
article 229 of Decree 222 only allows such forum and choice-of-law stipulations when per-
formance is to take place abroad. The court finds this perfectly compatible with articles 10
and 16 of the Colombian Constitution, which only require the exclusive application of Co-
lombian laws to foreigners located in Colombia and with the 1889 and 1940 Montevideo
Treaties, in which Colombia participated in the drafting (Colombia also acceded in 1933 to
the 1889 Treaty). Currently, a loan will be considered to be performed in the country where
the funds are disbursed and repaid. Montoya Alberti, supra note 34, at 104-106. However,
since only matters related to performance of loan agreements are referred to by Decree 222,
all matters related to execution of the international loan agreement, including its validity
and the capacity of the parties to contract, cannot be subject to foreign arbitration. This
outcome has been criticized. See Leavy, Governing Law and Foreign Loans: Colombia's Su-
preme Court Decides, 4 INTER-AMERICAN LEGAL MATERIALS [INTER-AM. L.M.] 163-78 (1988).
48. C6D PRoc. Civ Y CoM. art. 1 (Argen.). This is also true in Chile. See ARBITRAJE
Co ZRc AL, supra note 27, at 322-23.
49. Decision 24: Andean Foreign Investment Code, Codified Text of Nov. 30, 1976, 16
I.L.M. 138-53 (1977). The Members of the Andean Pact are Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Vene-
zuela, and Colombia. Chile is no longer a member. However, investment contracts entered
into under the rules of the Foreign Investment Statute (Decreto Ley 600, D.O. No. 28.901 of
July 13, 1974, reprinted in Colecci6n Textos Legales No. 13, at 154) cannot be subject to
foreign arbitration (Decreto Ley 2349 art. 7(1), D.O. No. 30.201 of Oct. 28, 1978, reprinted
in Colecci6n Textos Legales No. 56, at 220). The same is true in the case of concession
contracts concerning public property or property affected to the public use. Id. art. 7(2).
Other Chilean laws exclude certain contracts from foreign arbitration and foreign court ju-
risdiction. This is the case of article 13 of Decree Law 1089 on Oil Contracts, Decreto Ley
1089, D.O. No. 29.199 of July 9, 1975, reprinted in Colecci6n Textos Legales No. 25, at 176,
and article 10 of Decree Law 1557 on Contracts Concerning Natural Atomic Materials,
Decreto Ley 1557, D.O. No. 29.572 of Sept. 30, 1976, reprinted in Colecci6n Textos Legales
No. 35, at 57. The general principle is that these contracts directly involve national sover-
eignty and the exercise of sovereign powers. ARrrRAJE CoMERcIAL, supra note 27, at 334-37.
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have an equivalent provision.50 Article 34 of new Decision 220
leaves each member country free to choose, under its own domestic
legislation, the dispute resolution mechanism applicable to foreign
investment and foreign technology contracts. Thus, the Andean
Pact legal framework no longer prevents its members from agree-
ing to foreign arbitration in these areas, and now, the issue is en-
tirely left to their municipal laws.
5 1
Latin American countries have traditionally felt that the laws
which control crucial areas such as foreign investment, industrial
promotion, trademark, antitrust legislation, as well as natural re-
sources and strategic activities, should not be left to the decision of
foreign courts or arbitrators.52  A careful appraisal of the majority
50. Decision 220, La Comisi6n del Acuerdo de Cartagena, 26/27 REV. DER. INDUS. 503
(1987). Esquirol, Foreign Investment: Revision of the Andean Foreign Investment Code, 29
HARV. INT'L L.J. 169-77 (1988); E. MURPHY. JR., THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN ANDEAN FOREIGN
INvzsTmENT LAWS, INTERNATIONAL BUsINEss IN 1989 10.1-.20 (C. Holgren ed. 1989).
51. Actually, article 51 of Decision 24 excluded foreign adjudication and arbitration
with respect to foreign investment and technology contracts even if the host state is not a
party to the transaction. In a number of Latin American countries, where foreign invest-
ment is concerned, foreign arbitral and foreign forum clauses are excluded with respect to
certain state contracts or in transactions concerning the state's sovereign powers or author-
ity. See supra notes 29, 31, 37, 39, 41, 49 and accompanying text. In Colombia, for instance,
article 74 of Decree 222, supra note 44, providing that contracts to which the state or a state
entity is a party are governed by Colombian law and subject to the jurisdiction of Colom-
bian courts. See Roffe, Calvo y su Vigencia en America Latina, 17 REv. DER. INDUs. 353,
362-67, 376 (1984). The reference back to national laws by article 34 of new Decision 220
most likely means that in the absence of an international treaty, foreign arbitration will not
be possible in investment matters where the host state is a party or state sovereignty is
affected. Foreign arbitrations between a private party of the host state and a foreign party
will not necessarily be invalid in investment disputes.
In other matters, such as technology contracts, however the result might not be the
same. Article 16 (f) of Resolution 005-81-EFC/35 of the National Commission on Foreign
Investment and Technology (CONITE), 24 Peru, Oct. 28, 1981, excludes foreign law stipula-
tions and foreign court or arbitral clauses also from technology transactions between private
parties. 4 REv. DER. INDUS, 180, 183 (1982). Under article 2(g) of Resolution 283 of the Min-
istry of Industry, Commerce, and Integration of Ecuador, any dispute growing out of a for-
eign technology contract must be submitted to the laws and courts of Ecuador through a
specific contractual provision. 2 REv. DER. INDUs. 205-08 (1980).
Nevertheless, in other Latin American countries, such as Argentina, foreign arbitral or
court clauses in foreign technology contracts are not prohibited. Law 22426, 3 Rzv. DER.
INDUS. 224-27 (1981). In Mexico, foreign arbitral clauses in technology contracts are allowed
provided that the arbitrator applies Mexican law: Law on the Control and Registration of
the Transfer of Technology and the use and Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks, 4
Rev. DER. INDUS. 169, 172 (1982).
52. Grigera Na6n, supra note 15, at 8-10. For instance, article 19 of the Mining Code of
Uruguay provides that any contract conferring mining rights must be subject to the laws
and jurisdiction of Uruguay and any contrary clause is null and void. DiAluo OFICIAL DR LA
REP(BLICA ORIENTAL DEL URUGUAY [D.O.] No. 21175, Feb. 16, 1982 (Uru.), at 677-78. Never-
theless, some Latin American countries have signed or ratified the World Bank ICSID Con-
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of Latin American legislations reveals, however, that these limita-
tions do not connote a general rejection of arbitration in these ar-
eas, but only a delimitation on a case-by-case basis of matters
which can be arbitrated. Caution is exercised because these issues
are considered non-arbitrable on account of specific political, insti-
tutional, or economic reasons, particularly, when the state is in-
volved in the transaction. Nevertheless, even this cautious attitude
is now in the process of being substantially revised.
3. Arbitration and Foreign Investment
In this particular area, recent developments indicate an in-
creasingly positive attitude regarding international commercial ar-
bitration and foreign investment. Before specifically reviewing
them, it seems useful to consider the attitude that prevailed until
recently.
In Argentina, for instance, the inability to arbitrate foreign in-
vestment questions applied only to certain matters, such as the ac-
cess of foreign investment to certain strategic areas or the availa-
bility of foreign exchange for profit remittance and capital
repatriation. These matters involve the relationship between the
state and the foreign investor and would thus fall under the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of Argentine federal courts pursuant to Article 100
of the Argentine Constitution." Nevertheless, other aspects related
to foreign investment (such as joint ventures which channel the
private investment) could always be subject to foreign arbitration
if certain conditions set out in Argentine procedural law had been
met."
Latin American countries have been willing to accept arbitra-
tion in investment matters to the extent that it did not force arbi-
tration of issues which touch upon the exercise of the host state's
sovereign rights. This willingness can be seen in agreements be-
tween the United States and a number of Latin American coun-
tries to allow United States investment to qualify for investment
insurance program under the Overseas Private Investment Corpo-
vention. Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, and Haiti have signed the convention;
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, and Paraguay have ratified the convention.
53. CONsTITUCION DE LA NACI6N ARGENTINA art. 100.
54. See supra notes 28-31 and corresponding text and infra note 147 and corresponding
text. Grigera Na6n, Arbitraje Comercial Internacional Solucion de Controversias en
Materia de Inversiones Extranjeras, 48 Rxv. COL. As. B.A. 39-43 (1988).
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ration (OPIC). These agreements authorize the United States gov-
ernment to subrogate the claims of an insured private investor who
has been affected by an expropriatory action. Under these agree-
ments, disputes between the United States government and the
host state arising from those claims are to be resolved through ar-
bitration. However, only matters involving public international law
may be submitted to arbitration thereunder. In addition, arbitra-
tion is only possible after exhaustion of remedies before the courts
of the host state. 5  The agreement with Brazil clearly states: (i)
that matters remaining within the internal jurisdiction of a sover-
eign state are not arbitrable; and (ii) that claims arising out of ex-
propriation of property belonging to foreign private investors do
not present questions of public international law, unless local rem-
edies of the host state have been exhausted and there has been a
denial of justice. Furthermore, the Brazilian government has de-
clared that a mere adverse resolution by Brazilian courts against a
private investor is not a denial of justice; only actions or omissions
barring access to justice or delaying adjudication in violation of ap-
plicable Brazilian procedural law will qualify as such."'
A similar attitude vis-a-vis international jurisdictions has been
evidenced by other Latin American countries, which arguably re-
flects their attitude toward international arbitration regarding the
55. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 546 (1986) (addressing
agreements signed with Brazil and Ecuador).
56. H. SIiNER & D. VAGTS, supra note 55, at 546-47. Argentina signed an Investment
Guarantee Agreement with the United States which took force on May 22, 1961. Ley 15.803,
21-A. A.D.L.A. 15 (1961). This was later reformed through a Protocol executed by both
countries on June 5, 1963. Protocol to Investment Guarantee Agreement, June 5, 1963,
United States-Argentina, 2 I.L.M. 776. The Protocol allows the U.S. Government to prose-
cute the claims of insured U.S. investors against Argentina. Any such claims may be submit-
ted to negotiations between both governments only after (i) exhaustion of local remedies
before Argentine courts and (ii) in the opinion of the U.S. Government, a denial of justice
has resulted. However, only public international law issues related to expropriatory action,
war, or civil war may be subject to negotiations and arbitration. Matters of internal jurisdic-
tion are excluded from such negotiations and arbitration, including any question governed
by the Argentine Constitution or the laws of Argentina regarding the reasons, opportunity,
or legal character of an expropriation; and any final decision from Argentine courts on any
matter contemplated in the Constitution or the laws of Argentina. Any claim concerning the
treatment of property belonging to foreign investors is not of public international law nature
unless exhaustion of local remedies has taken place and a denial of justice occurred. Id. art.
3(b). Only the governments of the U.S. and Argentina may be parties to the arbitral pro-
ceedings. Each party shall designate an arbitrator. The chosen arbitrator will choose a chair-
man, who must not be a national of either country. If there is no agreement on the name of
the chairman, he/she will be designated by the Secretary of the Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration at The Hague. Id. art. 3(c).
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same issues.57
Notwithstanding the above, Latin American countries are
gradually moving away from positions favoring the exclusive juris-
diction of national courts with respect to foreign investment dis-
putes propounded by the Calvo Doctrine."s At present, Latin
American countries are showing an enhanced willingness to submit
this type of dispute to international commercial arbitration. The
reasons for this are several. On one hand, Latin American leaders
seem to be persuaded that in order to overcome the unprecedented
poverty of the region, it is necessary to favor Latin American free
market economies that are not only fully interconnected regionally,
but also globally integrated with the world economy." To attain
this end, it would be necessary to eliminate obstacles to free enter-
prise and to create a favorable climate for attracting foreign
investment.
International commercial arbitration would be an important
part of the general package aimed at enhancing the security and
predictability required by foreign investors. Probably, it is also
felt, in view of the reduced standard of living, and heavy debt bur-
den of Latin American countries,6" that they simply do not have
sufficient bargaining power to insist on the exclusive jurisdiction of
their courts without jeopardizing foreign investment.
This new attitude in Latin America regarding foreign invest-
ment and international commercial arbitration is also in part re-
lated to President George Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initi-
ative, aimed at creating a free trade zone in the Americas, fostering
57. For instance, upon ratifying the Interamerican Costa Rica Convention on Human
Rights of November 22, 1969, the Argentine Government made a reservation as to the scope
of the jurisdiction of the Interamerican Court of Human Rights. After stating that the Ar-
gentine Government would interpret the Convention in light of the principles and provi-
sions of the Argentine Constitution, it declared in an Annex that article 21 of the Conven-
tion, establishing that nobody may be deprived of his or her property without just
compensation, and reasons of public or social interest, should not be interpreted as allowing
the review by international tribunals of those matters concerning the Argentine Govern-
ment's political economic policies, court decisions on the meaning of public or social inter-
est, or just compensation. E.J. Hardoy, El Tratado de San Josk de Costa Rica, 48 REV. COL.
An. B.A. 93-103 (1988).
58. See Siqueiros, Arbitral Autonomy and National Sovereign Authority in Latin
America, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBrrRATION 183-93 (T. Carbonneau ed. 1990).
59. Pefia, La Integracion Latinoamericana en el Decenio de 1990: Tiene aun Sentido?,
INTEGRACION LATINOAMERICANA, Aug. 1990, at 36-40; Barbosa, Diez Atlos de ALADI: Lec-
ciones y Perspectivas, INITGRACION LATINOAMERICANA, Sept. 1990, at 24-28.
60. See Hurtado, Aspeetos politicos de la integracion latinoamericana, INTEGRAcIoN
LATINOAMERICANA, Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 3-8.
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foreign investment, and reducing the foreign debt burden of Latin
American countries."1 In several Latin American countries it is felt
that adequate means for the international resolution of investment
disputes, including international commercial arbitration, should be
put in place as a part of a Latin American response to President
Bush's initiative.
A significant step in this direction is the growing Latin Ameri-
can participation in the Convention establishing the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).2 Annex II of the Conven-
tion provides for arbitration to resolve investment disputes be-
tween the host country and the Agency." Since the Agency is sub-
rogated to the rights and claims of the private investor, a private
claim by a foreign investor, normally subject to the jurisdiction of
the courts of the host state under the Calvo doctrine, is "elevated"
to the level of an international claim subject to international
arbitration.
Another expression of this unprecedented trend is the growing
participation of Latin American countries in bilateral investment
treaties with developed countries in which international arbitration
is the chosen means of dispute resolution. It is significant that this
development is taking place at the same time that the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, in the process of resolving a dispute re-
61. United States Remarks on the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, June 27, 1990
and Sept. 14, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1566.
62. Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Oct. 11,
1985, 24 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter MIGA]. On September 17, 1990, the Argentine president
ratified the Convention establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
on the basis of powers previously conferred by the Argentine Congress under article 19 of
Law 23.697. BOLETIN OFFICIAL [B.O.] No. 26.989, Oct. 16, 1990. Argentina, however, has not
yet completed all membership requirements. This Convention has already been signed or
ratified by Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru, Chile, and Ecuador,
though only the last two countries have completed all membership requirements.
63. MIGA, supra note 62, Annex II, art. 4; see generally I. SHIHATA, MIGA AND FOREIGN
INvESTMENT 257-92 (1988).
64. Elettronica Sicula (Elsi), (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20, 1989). See Note,
Protezione Diplomatica delle Societa e Degli Azionisti e Trattato di Amicizia Italia-Stati
Uniti: II Caso Raytheon-Elsi Dinnanzi alla Corte Internazionale di Giustizia, 4 DIRrrro
DEL CoMasaclO INTERNAZIONALE 385-93 (1990); Note, International Court of Justice-diplo-
matic protection-U.S.-ltalian Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 249 (1990); Note, 4 FOREIGN INvEsTm Tr L.J. 320-29 (1989); Jeancolas, LArr~t Elet-
tronica Sicula S.P.A. (Elsi) du 20 juillet 1989, 94 REVUE Gg-iNRALE DE Dsorr INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC [REV. GiN. DR. INT'L PUB.] 701 (1990); Adler, The Exhaustion of the Local Remedies
Rule After the International Court of Justice's Decision in Elsi, 39 I.C.L.Q. 641-53 (1990);
Seidl-Hohenveldern, Elsi and Badger: The Two Raytheon Cases, 26 RIviSTA Di DuTTO IN-
TERNAZIONALE PRIVATO 2 PROcassuALE 261 (1990).
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garding a bilateral treaty, has gone well beyond the limits permit-
ted by the treaty itself and seems to have departed from the rule
established in Barcelona Traction. This rule excludes from diplo-
matic protection the controlling shareholders of a company incor-
porated in the host state where the foreign investment is located."6
It is significant that, for many, that part of the Barcelona Traction
ruling was considered to be an expression of the Calvo Doctrine.
7
For instance, Argentina is negotiating, has signed, or is in the
process of signing and ratifying a number of bilateral foreign in-
vestment treaties 8 providing for dispute resolution between the
foreign investor and the Argentine State, especially for important
issues such as expropriation, nationalization or foreign exchange
restrictions. The treaties call for ICSID arbitration if both parties
have ratified the 1965 ICSID Convention or arbitration under IC-
SID's Additional Facility arbitration rules if they have not, or for
ad-hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL's arbitration rules.
According to these treaties, the arbitrators are to decide dis-
putes submitted to them according to certain guidelines: The laws
of the host country including conflict-of-laws rules, the provisions
of the relevant investment treaty, the specific agreements made
with the investor concerned, and the principles of public interna-
tional law. The treaties provide for "adequate," "effective," and
sometimes "prompt" compensation in case of expropriation or na-
tionalization. Even though the treaties require the exhaustion of
local remedies before permitting arbitration, arbitration may in
any event be resorted to if the dispute has not been resolved lo-
cally within 18 months from the date the investor's claim was filed.
No provision is made as to the seat of the arbitral tribunal. Uru-
guay has also become a party to similar bilateral investment
treaties.6 9
65. Stern, La Protection Diplomatique des Investissements Internationaux, 117 JouR-
NAL Du Dorr INTERNATIONAL [JD.I.] 897, 934-35 (1990).
66. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belg. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb.
5, 1970).
67. Barberis, Carlos Calvo, 2 HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 41, 46 (1989).
68. The Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs has signed the following bilateral foreign
investment treaties--not yet approved by the Argentine Congress: with Great Britain (De-
cember 11, 1990), with the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union (June 28, 1990), with
Italy (May 22, 1990) and with the Federal Republic of Germany (April 9, 1991). Negotiation
and finalization of similar treaties with other countries, including the Federal Republic of
Germany and the United States, is presently under way. Information and texts supplied by
the Treaty Department of the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
69. One example is the Bilateral Investment Treaty of May 4, 1987 between Uruguay
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At least in the case of Argentina, these agreements appear to
be an abrupt departure from previous legal precedent and diplo-
matic tradition.7 0 Though it is too early to assess the final legal
impact-in view of the public and constitutional law issues in-
volved- these agreements should be seen as a frank and confident
gesture towards international arbitration as well as the means of
developing an international foreign host state and private investor
interest.
There remain uncertainty and controverted views on the "lex
fori" of international arbitrators. This is especially true in certain
vital areas such as the standards and measures of compensation in
cases of nationalization or expropriation" and the application of
international mandatory rules of national origin.7 2 Nevertheless,
the change in attitude of Latin American countries favoring inter-
national arbitration is by itself an important concession in favor of
private adjudication not subject to, or largely free from, state con-
trol. Such a concession is all the more significant in that it involves
issues of vital national interests in a time when international arbi-
tral tribunals lack settled legal principles to apply to foreign in-
vestment in weakened and changing economies. 7 3 Furthermore, all
and the Federal Republic of Germany, article XI. DIARIO DE SESIONES D LA CAMARA DE
REPRESENTANTES, Apr. 4, 1990, at 85-89.
70. See supra notes 29-31, 56-57 and accompanying text.
71. See Westberg, Compensation in Cases of Expropriation and Nationalization:
Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 5 FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 256 (1990);
Bowett, State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments on Compensation for
Termination or Breach, 1988 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49 (1989); Mendelson, The United King-
dom Nationalization Cases and the European Convention of Human Rights, 1986 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 33 (1987).
72. See von Mehren, Arbitration Between States and Foreign Enterprises: The Signif-
icance of the Institute of International Law's Santiago de Compostela Resolution, 5 FOR-
EIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 54 (1990); El-Kosheri & Riad, The Law Governing a New Generation
of Petroleum Agreements: Changes in the Arbitration Process, 1 FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J.
257 (1986); Grigera Na6n, The Applicability of Transnational Rules in International Com-
mercial Arbitration, Preliminary Report (Civil Law Countries), International Law Associa-
tion Queensland Conference 2-12 (1990). The principle of boundless party autonomy within
the context of international commercial arbitration is still a matter of serious objections in
Latin America. For discussions on the topic, see GARRO, ARBTRAiE COMERCIAL Y LABORAL EN
CENTRAL AMERICA 161-65 (1990). On the problems of uncertainty and unpredictability if
arbitrators are allowed to choose the applicable law, see Wengler, L'Evolution Moderne du
Droit International Priv et la Prgvisibilitg du Droit Applicable, 79 REVUE CRITIQUE DE
Dnorr INTERNATIONAL Pnrvt [R.C.D.I.P] 657, 671-73 (1990).
73. On the dilemmas posed by international commercial arbitration to sovereign states
and to the safeguarding of notions of justice, see Vagts, Dispute-Resolution Mechanisms in
International Business, 203 RECUEIL DES COURS 13, 86-88 (1987-11); Park, National Law
and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in International Arbitration
63 Tut. L. REv. 647 (1989).
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this is happening in an area in which legal and political traditions
and valid sovereignty concerns make it particularly difficult to
break new ground. Proponents of international arbitration should
seize this historical moment and respond to the challenge by help-
ing to fashion an international investment law adequately respon-
sive to the sovereign, social, and economic interests of the host
state. This aim would be difficult to attain without arbitral panels
comprised of arbitrators from underdeveloped and developing na-
tions.74 Otherwise, Latin America's increasingly favorable attitude
toward the arbitration of foreign investment disputes might vanish
as soon as the region overcomes its economic difficulties.
C. The Agreement to Arbitrate and the Compromiso
Latin American procedural laws normally contemplate both
the arbitral agreement ("clAusula compromisoria")76 and the "com-
promiso." The arbitral agreement results in a decision by the par-
ties to submit future disputes to arbitration and the "compromiso"
refers to the specific submission to arbitration of an already ex-
isting dispute.
The "compromiso" is actually a contract between the parties
and the arbitrators (the latter should also sign it or implicitly
abide by it by accepting their designation as arbitrators thereun-
der) where the names of the arbitrators, the matters submitted to
arbitration, and the circumstances causing the dispute (including
the different positions of the parties) are set out in full. The "com-
promiso" can also establish a penalty against the party unwilling
to comply with the arbitral proceedings. In the "compromiso," the
parties may also determine any other aspect concerning the arbi-
tration, including the procedural rules governing the arbitral
74. Shihata, The Institute of International Law's Resolution on Arbitration between
States and Foreign Enterprises - A Comment, 5 FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 65, 67-68
(1990).
75. Argentina: C6D. PRoc. Crv. Y CoM. art. 736 (Argen.). Bolivia: C61. COM. art 1479;
C6D. PRoc. Crv. arts. 712, 739 (Bol.). Brazil: Baptista, CLAUSULA COMPROMISSORIA E COM-
PROMISO, in ARBrrAGEM COMERCAL 31-42 (J.C. de Magalhaes & L.O. Baptista eds. 1986).
Chile: Though not mentioned in black-letter law, it is admitted by authorities and in prac-
tice. Eyzaguirre Echeverria, supra note 19, at 46. Ecuador- It is admitted within the frame-
work of arbitral rules for the Chambers of Commerce. Jim6nez Salazar, supra note 15, at 78.
Colombia: It is also admitted. Diaz Rubio, supra note 15, at 58-59. Mfxico: It is also admit-
ted. Brisefto Sierra, supra note 15, at 96; C6D. CoM. art. 1415 (Mex.). Peru: C61. Paoc. CIV.
arts. 713-716 (Peru). Venezuela: C6D. PRoc. Civ. art. 608 (Venez.); Samtleben,
Schiedsklauseln in Peru and Venezuela, 22 RIW 20-23 (1987) [hereinafter
Schiedsklauseln].
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proceeding."'
The execution of the "compromiso" is the first step in arbitral
proceedings. In fact, the "compromiso" is external to arbitral pro-
ceedings. It is a preliminary, but vital stage, which is carried out by
the parties before the arbitrators have accepted their designation
as such. A plaintiff may not file a complaint prior to the "com-
promiso," unless it has been so agreed or imposed by the arbitral
institutional rules chosen by the parties.7 The description in the
"compromiso" of the controversy, the opposing position of each
party, and the points subject to arbitral decision is the arbitral
76. Argentina: C6D. PROC. Civ. Y COM. arts. 739-741 (Argen.) (must be in writing). Bo-
livia: C6D. PROC. Civ. arts. 713-715 (Bol.) (in writing). However, Civil Code article 1481 es-
tablishes that the arbitral agreement made through public deed implies the exclusion by the
parties of court proceedings for resolving their dispute. Brazil: C.C. arts. 1037-1040, C.P.C
arts. 1072-1077 (Braz.) (in writing). Chile: C6D. ORG. Tain. art. 234 (chile) (in writing). Ecua-
dor. (in writing in the case of arbitration before the Chamber of Commerce (Ley de Arbi-
traje Comercial art. 5)). In ad hoc arbitration, it must have been extended in a public in-
strument or an instrument acknowledged before a public authority. C6D. PROC. CIv. art.
1014-15 (Ecuador). Jimbnez Salazar, supra note 15, at 78. Colombia: Decree 2279, supra
note 11, art. 3 (in writing). Diaz Rubio, supra note 15, at 59. Honduras: C6D. PROc. art. 850
(Hond.) (by public deed). Mexico: C.F.P.C. arts. 220, 611 (in writing). Nevertheless, articles
1052(I) and 1053(IX) of the old text of the Commercial Code have been used to argue that
the arbitral agreement must be incorporated into a public instrument, and there is a Su-
preme Court decision to this effect. Sem. Jud. Fed., Suplemento de 1933, at 852; Brisefto
Sierra, supra note 15, at 96. Nevertheless, after the modifications introduced into the Com-
mercial Code, see supra note 10, there is no doubt that though the arbitration agreement
must be in writing, it need not be notarized. C6D. CoM. art. 1417 (Mex.). See also 2 J.L.
SiQutnos, LA NUEVA REGULACION DEL ARBrrRAJE EN EL CODIGO DE COMERCIO. EL Foao 157,
158, 166 (1989); Hoagland, Modifications of Mexican Arbitration Law, 7 J. INT'L ARB. 91, 94
(1990). Paraguay: C6D. PRoc. Civ. art. 777 (Para.)(written or by private instrument). Peru:
C6D. Civ. art. 1910 (Peru)(in writing); C6D. Psoc. Civ. art. 552 (Peru)(requiring that it be
incorporated into a public deed) is no longer applicable; Montoya Alberti, supra note 19, at
56. Uruguay: C6D. PROC. CIV. art. 540 (Uru.)(by public instrument). Venezuela: C6D. PROC.
Civ. art. 608 (Venez.)(must be made by "authentic" act); Schiedshlauseln, supra note 75, at
22. Authentic act would include both a public document originally made before and regis-
tered with a notary public or public official or a private document acknowledged before a
public official or notary public. F. Gabald6n, supra note 15, at 51-56.
77. In Argentina, articles 34-37 of the Arbitral Rules of the Arbitral Tribunal of the
Buenos Aires Stock Exchange establish that the compromiso is drawn up after the claim,
the answers to the claim and the counterclaims (if any) have been filed. However, this Arbi-
tral Tribunal acts ex aequo et bono, and therefore is not bound by strict procedural rules,
including those requiring the drawing up of a compromiso in lieu of having claim, answer,
and counterclaim. In Venezuela, this possibility has been ruled out by doctrinal opinions.
The claim, counterclaim, and answer thereto are not allowed before or after the com-
promiso, and the parties cannot change this situation. F. GAALD6N, supra note 15, at 65-66.
However, in Peru, according to article I of the Arbitral Rules of the Lima Chamber of Com-
merce, arbitral proceedings are started by a compromiso extended before notary public.
Thereafter, the parties are authorized under articles 9-10 to submit in writing their claims
and respective answers.
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equivalent of a claim, response, and counterclaim. In the arbitral
context, however, they are merged into a single document, and
signed by all the parties, including the arbitrators.
7 8
With the exception of Mexico, Paraguay, Colombia, and Ecua-
dor in case of institutional arbitration under the rules of local or
foreign chambers of commerce, execution of a "compromiso" is re-
quired even if there is already an arbitral agreement between the
parties. 9 As a result, in most Latin American countries, an arbitral
agreement inserted in a contract is not operative until the "com-
promiso" has been signed and a specific dispute has arisen. If any
party refuses to sign, or no agreement is reached on any of the
points to be covered by it (including the designation of the arbitra-
tors), most Latin American legislations allow any party to resort to
specific performance, and have the competent state court execute
the "compromiso" on behalf of the reluctant party. In such case,
the arbitration will proceed and the award will be binding on the
party not signing the "compromiso."' 0 However, even in countries
requiring the "compromiso," it is not necessary (with the exception
of Brazil) to wait for the execution of the "compromiso" to obtain
a stay for matters falling within the scope of an existing arbitral
agreement. A stay of court proceedings may be accomplished
78. L. PALACIO, supra note 18, at 112.
79. Mexico: Briseilo Sierra, supra note 15, at 96. In view of the existence of different
opinions on whether a compromiso is required, Sierra recommends that it be executed as a
precautionary measure. However, this recommendation is no longer applicable in view of the
recent reform of the Mexican Commercial Code which excludes any reference to the com-
promiso and provides that the arbitral agreement determines by itself the stay of court
proceedings on the same subject matter submitted to arbitration. C6D. COM. arts. 1415, 1427
(Mex.). Ecuador: Ley de Arbitraje Comercial arts. 1, 6; C6n. PRoC. Cry. art. 1015 (Ecuador);
Jimnez Salazar, supra note 15, at 78-79.
80. See C. LARREATEOUI, supra note 15, at 45-63. Argentina: C6n. PROC. CIv. Y COM. art.
742 (Argen.). Bolivia: C6D. PROC. Civ. art. 716 (Bol.). Though there is no specific provision in
this sense, this is also the situation in Chile. Eyzaguirre Echeverria, supra note 19, at 46-48,
52. Ecuador. see Jim6nez Salazar, supra, note 15, at 79-80, 83. The same situation exists in
Panama. C6D. PRoc. arts. 1421-1426 (Pan.). Honduras: see Lebn, Ejecucion de La sentencia
arbitral en Honduras, in Liber Amicorum Zubkowski, supra note 14, at 354. Peru: C6D.
PROC. CIv. art. 556 (Peru). Venezuela: COD. PROC. Crv. arts. 610(2), 611-614 (Venez.);
Schiedsklausein, supra note 75, at 22. This means that, with the sole exception of Brazil,
the existence of an arbitral agreement allows any party thereto to uphold it by raising the
defense of incompetence or lack of jurisdiction in order to bar court proceedings started by
the other party on the same subject which falls under the arbitral agreement. In countries
(except Brazil) where a compromiso is required, this may be done simultaneously with the
request addressed to a competent court to have the compromiso executed through specific
performance. On the situation in Argentina, see A. FAHRn & A. FAlis, LA CLAUSULA COM-
PROMISORIA 67-69 (1945); L. PALACIO, supra note 18, at 52; H. ALSINA, 8 TRATADO TEoxuco
PRACTICO Dz DERMCHO PRocasAL CVIL Y Coasci¢AL 30 (1965).
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merely by raising the existence of the arbitral agreement as a de-
fense.81 However, the "compromiso" is still required prior to com-
mencing arbitral proceedings against the party who resorted to the
courts in order to sidestep the arbitration.
There is an apparent similarity between this system and the
ICC Rules that require the parties to agree on terms of reference.
These usually include the same points normally contemplated in
the "compromiso."82 The terms of reference are executed after the
arbitrators have been designated and the parties have unilaterally
set forth their claims and counterclaims through separate
presentations submitted to the arbitral tribunal.8 3 If any of the
parties fails to sign the terms of reference, the ICC Court of Arbi-
tration, after giving its approval to the terms of reference, will or-
der the arbitral proceedings to continue, ultimately having binding
effects on the recalcitrant party.
4
On the other hand, under most Latin American legislations, an
independent claim to obtain the issuance of the "compromiso" has
to be filed with a state court. This claim may be answered and
objected to by the respondent. When making his decision, the
judge might be forced to hear evidence in order to determine what
issues are to be included in the "compromiso" and the way to
phrase the different terms and claims of the parties. Needless to
say, the procedure might become lengthy and cumbersome.85
81. Argentina: L. PALACIO, supra note 18, at 52. Chile: P. AYLWxN AzocAR, EL Juicio
ARBITRAL 321-23 (1958). This was the solution in Mexico even before the recent modification
of its Commercial Code eliminating the compromiso CYF.P.C. art. 620 (Mex.). The word com-
promiso indistinctly refers to the specific submission and to the "clausula compromisoria."
Of course, under the new provisions of the Mexican Commercial Code which do not require
execution of a compromiso in addition to the arbitral agreement, the mere existence of the
latter, if raised as a defense, will suffice to obtain the stay of court proceedings in a dispute
falling within the scope of the arbitral agreement. C6n. Com. arts. 1418, 1427 (Mex.). Santo
Domingo: Campillo, El Arbitraje en Santo Domingo, in Liber Amicorum Zubkowski, supra
note 14, at 556, 557-69. Panama: C6DIGO JUDICIAL art. 1414 (Pan.). This also seems to be the
solution in Guatemala, though article 276 of the Procedural Code is less clear than its Pana-
manian counterpart. Chac6n Corado, La Conciliaci6n y el Arbitraje coma Instrumentos
para la Soluci6n de Conflictos en Guatemala, in Liber Amicorum Zubkowski, supra note
14, at 331, 343-44.
82. Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce,
1988 I.C.C. art. 13(1).
83. Id. arts. 3-5.
84. Id. art. 13(2).
85. Garro, Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and Jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribu-
nals in Latin America, 1 J. Ir'L. Aam. 293, 315 (1984); de Trazegnies, Los Conceptos y las
Cosas: Vicisitudes Peruanas de la Clausula Compromisoria y del Compromiso Arbitral, in
Liber Amicorum Zubkowski, supra note 14, at 543-54. In Argentina, the interested party
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There are certain Latin American countries which do not al-
low specific performance for execution of the "compromiso" when
one of the parties fails to sign it. However, after recent Venezuelan
legislation, which allows the execution of the "compromiso"
through specific performance, Brazil is the last significant example.
Brazil holds only the party who refuses to sign the submission lia-
ble for damages. 86 Although draft legislation has been proposed in
submits its claim before the competent court which would have decided the dispute if there
had not been an arbitral clause. This claim is transmitted to the other party, who answers it.
The court will immediately call for a hearing to have the compromiso executed by the par-
ties. If the recalcitrant party does not show up, the court will have the compromiso drawn
up according to the draft submitted by the plaintiff. If the other party opposes the execu-
tion of the compromiso, the judge will decide this point after short proceedings ("trianite de
los incidentes"), or preferably a single hearing with reduced opportunity to produce evi-
dence. C6D. PROC. Civ. Y CoM. arts. 175-185 (Argen.). Nevertheless, the court may only ac-
cept evidence concerning the existence of the arbitral clause and any dispute between the
parties within its scope. The interested party must also set out the specific points on which
the arbitral decision must be made. The court is not allowed to decide on the substance of
the dispute. If both circumstances are present, the court will reject the objections raised by
the recalcitrant party and will approve the compromiso. Judgment of Apr. 7, 1967, Camira
Segunda de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Plata, Argen., 129 L.L. 607; Judgment
of Dec. 22, 1952, Cim. Nac. Apel. en lo Comercial, Cap. Fed. Sala 'B', Argen., 1953-II J.A.
233-35; Judgment of Mar. 4, 1949, Cimara 1 de Apelaci6n La Plata, Sala I, Argen., 1948-II
J.A. 278-80. If the parties do not agree on the points to be submitted to arbitration, the
court will also decide this issue and approve the points to be included in the compromiso.
The decision of the court on any of the above issues is subject to appeal. L. PALACIO, supra
note 18, at 72-79. In a recent decision, the Argentine National Commercial Court of Appeals
(Cameara Nacional de Apelaci6nes en lo Comercial) determined that within the context of an
entirely domestic commercial dispute, the fact that the parties have agreed on the arbitra-
tion of the ICC does not mean that the ICC's International Court of Arbitration will super-
sede the Argentine courts' final determination concerning the incorporation of contested
issues in the compromiso or the terms of reference in case of discrepancy between the par-
ties. Perez Companc S.A. and Bridas S.A. v. Ecofisa S.A. and Petrofisa S.A., 6 INT'L ARE.
Rzp. A-1 to A-10 (1991).
In Venezuela, the procedure to have the compromiso executed is more complex. If one
of the parties questions the validity of the arbitral agreement, a period of 15 days to offer
evidence on that issue is provided before the court is asked to decide the specific perform-
ance request. Within five days of the expiration of this period, the court will decide on the
validity of the arbitral agreement. This decision is subject to appeal. C6n. PRoc. Civ. art. 611
(Venez.). After the validity of the arbitral agreement is declared, a procedure to establish
the substance of the compromiso is opened. In cases where the recalcitrant party is absent,
the issues to be arbitrated under the compromiso will be those proposed by the party pre-
sent. In case of disagreement on the issues, the court will decide. Id. arts. 613-614; Gonzalez,
El Proceso Arbitral en el C6digo de Procedimiento Civil Venezolano de 1987, in Liber
Amicorum Zubkowski, supra note 14, at 621. In Uruguay, the procedure for obtaining the
execution of the compromiso through specific performance is similar to that of Argentina.
C61. PROC. Civ. arts. 535-538, 548 (Uru.); D. BARRIOS DE ANGELIS, supra note 15, at 385-87,
390-93.
86. L.O. Baptista, supra note 75, at 38; de Magalhaes, A Clausula Arbitral nos Con-
tratos Internacionais, in ARBITEAGEM COMzRCIAL, supra note 29, at 65 [hereinafter Clausula
Arbitral]; M.O.F. FIGumEDO SANTOS, 0 COMERCio ExTERNO E A ARmITRAGEM 66 (1986).
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Brazil to resolve this and other problems,8 7 there is still opposition
to this sort of change.8 8 Nevertheless, there are doctrinal opinions
contending that specific performance is generally available when-
ever the arbitral clause is inserted in an international contract.
Since Brazil is a party to the 1923 Geneva Protocol on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration,8 ' which acknowledges the recogni-
tion and effectiveness of arbitration clauses, specific performance
of the "compromiso" and the designation of the arbitrators should
be available if the Protocol is applicable to the case.' 0 In the case
of Ecuador, although specific performance of the arbitral clause
would not be possible in ad hoc arbitration cases, it is clearly avail-
able under the rules governing institutional arbitration within the
context of local or foreign chambers of commerce.
D. Prospects for Elimination of the Compromiso
Many believe that Latin American countries should follow the
lead of other countries (such as France) and eliminate the "com-
promiso" from their procedural codes. This might diminish the op-
portunity for chicanery aimed at barring arbitral proceedings. Also,
it is more consistent with the idea that arbitrators should be al-
lowed, within certain limits, to decide on their own jurisdiction.
For example, before making the "compromiso," the court must de-
termine whether there is a dispute falling within the scope of the
arbitral agreement which implies that the court is deciding on the
arbitrators' jurisdiction. If the "compromiso" were not required,
the plaintiff would transmit its claim, and the names of proposed
arbitrators to the other party, who would in its turn answer the
claim, propose its arbitrators, and submit its counterclaim. The
87. Pre-draft law on Arbitration, Diario Oficial da Uniao (D.O.U.], Feb. 27, 1987, Secao
1, at 2909. Article 5 allows specific performance of the arbitral agreement. Articles 21-26
govern the specific performance proceedings. See Pestalozzi, Arbitration and its new pros-
pects in Brazil, 4 J. INT'L ARB. 131-40 (1987). According to the different Draft Law prepared
by the Brazilian Ministry of Justice, article 267 (VII) of the Brazilian Procedural Code is
reformed so that even without a compromiso, the commencement of arbitral proceedings
brings about a stay of any court proceedings regarding a dispute which falls within the scope
of the arbitration agreement. Gabinete do Ministro, Portaria No. 298-A, June 20, 1988.
88. Ramos Pereira, 0 Juizo Arbitral e o Projecto de lei Sobre Arbitragem, 283 Revista
Forense 455-58 (1983).
89. Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, Sept. 24, 1923, 27-28 L.N.T.S. 157.
90. Clausula Arbitral, supra note 86, at 65-68. But see Strenger, supra note 35, at 46-
47. On the other hand Brazilian courts do not seem to be inclined to take into account the
provisions of the 1923 Geneva Protocol. See Samtleben, Aktuelle Fragen der internation-
alen Handelsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit in Brasilien, 10 RIW 769-70 (1989).
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court intervenes only in cases where the parties disagree on the
third arbitrator or one of the parties fails to appoint its own arbi-
trator. Under this process it is up to the appointed arbitrators, and
not the court, to decide if there is a dispute and whether it is en-
compassed within the arbitral clause.
It has been suggested that the ratification of either the 1958
New York Convention or of the 1975 Panama Convention would
change legislation in Latin American countries regarding the "com-
promiso." This belief comes from the fact that both Conventions
grant automatic effectiveness to the arbitral agreement, without re-
quiring that a specific submission be made for each dispute.9 1
1. The New York Convention
The New York Convention only applies to international arbi-
trations or arbitrations held in a foreign state. Such state must be
a party to the Convention if the first reservation under article 1(3)
has been made. An arbitration held or to be held in the forum may
also be considered "international" for this purpose if it concerns a
foreign national or an international transaction. Therefore, "lo-
cal" arbitrations held in the forum will be governed exclusively by
the law of the forum and subject to the forum's "compromiso" re-
quirements irrespective of such forum's ratification of the New
York Convention.
There is no doubt that Article II of the New York Convention
is a uniform law provision. It unifies the internal laws of all coun-
tries ratifying the Convention with respect to international arbitra-
tions held abroad. Under paragraph 3 of Article II of the Conven-
tion, any party invoking a valid arbitral agreement within the
context of an international arbitration must obtain automatic re-
ferral of the dispute to arbitration.
9 3
Nevertheless, nothing in its text suggests that the referral can-
not be made in accordance with the legislation of the ratifying
country where the arbitral agreement was invoked, if arbitration is
to take place in such country. In fact, Article II of the New York
Convention grants mandatory force to the arbitral agreement un-
derstood both as "clause compromissoire" (submission of future
91. van den Berg, L'Arbitrage Commercial en Amhrique Latine, 2 REv. ARB. 123, 137-
41 (1979).




disputes) and as "compromiso" (submission of existing disputes);
but it does not regulate the way in which local legislation will
render compulsory effects to arbitral agreements. " The procedure
for specific performance is a matter left to each national legisla-
tion. It may be required that the parties first draw up a "com-
promiso," and if any of them fails to do so, a court will do it on
behalf of the recalcitrant party and thereafter refer the dispute to
the arbitral tribunal.
It should not be assumed that article II of the 1958 New York
Convention does not "leave room" for the "compromiso."' This
article only provides in paragraph 3 that if an arbitral agreement
exists and meets the requirements generally set out in Article II,
the courts must, at the request of any of the parties, refer the par-
ties to arbitration. Any court proceedings relating to a dispute
which falls within the scope of the arbitral clause must be stayed.
As previously indicated,9 in the majority of Latin American
countries which require a "compromiso," its very existence, (i.e.,
the fact that a "compromiso" has actually been executed by the
parties or through court intervention) is not necessary for ob-
taining the stay of court proceedings. A stay can be obtained by
raising the existence of a valid arbitral clause. This was true even
before such countries ratified the 1958 New York Convention.
The preclusive effects of an arbitral agreement with respect to
existing or intended court proceedings should be differentiated
from the similar, but by no means identical, issue of specific per-
formance of the arbitral agreement. Specific performance may sur-
face against the backdrop of at least two different scenarios: (i)
once the stay of court proceedings regarding a matter subject to
arbitration has been obtained, the party wishing arbitration to pro-
ceed seeks court support for overcoming the other party's resis-
tance to the commencement of the arbitration (e.g., the designa-
tion of arbitrators) or (ii) where no court proceedings have been
commenced but the resistance or passive attitude of the recalci-
trant party makes it necessary to resort to court support to get the
arbitration under way.
94. Id.
95. van den Berg, The New York Convention 1958 and the Panama Convention 1975:
Redundancy or Compatibility?, 5 Asia. INT'L 214, 217 n. 9 (1989) (the author manifests his
disagreement with my views on this topic as expressed in the previous version of the present
article published at 5 AMw. INT'L 137 (1989)).
96. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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The 1958 New York Convention does not address these issues
and, therefore, each member country is free to introduce and
maintain the procedural rules of its choice concerning the specific
performance of the arbitral clause (e.g., obtaining the commence-
ment and regular development of arbitral proceedings, irrespective
of the opposition or passive attitude of the recalcitrant party). As a
result, countries are free to decide that arbitral proceedings may
not commence before a "compromiso" has been made, indicating,
among other things, the names of the arbitrators and the contro-
verted issues.
The spirit of the 1958 New York Convention is violated if a
party can make a conscious effort not to sign the "compromiso"
rendering the arbitral agreement inoperative. This is not the pre-
dominant situation in Latin America today. With the exception of
Brazil, specific performance of the "compromiso" may always be
obtained through court intervention. In other words, specific per-
formance of the arbitral agreement is obtained through the specific
performance of the "compromiso," and this is perfectly compatible
with both the 1958 New York and the 1975 Panama Conventions.
Strictly speaking, the attitude of a Latin American country
that upholds the "compromiso" will be different depending on
whether Article II is invoked to obtain referral of the dispute to
arbitration in the forum or abroad. In the first case, that country's
local legislation requiring that a "compromiso" be drawn up prior
to arbitration, through specific performance if necessary, will ap-
ply. This reflects the private international law principle that for-
mal aspects of arbitration are governed by the law of the country
where the act or procedural activity (arbitral proceedings) is per-
formed (lex loci actus).
It is also conceivable, however, that the courts of the Latin
American country which ratified the 1958 New York Convention
will not hold international arbitrations to the same mandatory
rules reserved for entirely local or domestic arbitrations. In light of
this reasoning, courts might conclude that the "compromiso" is not
required for international arbitrations held in the forum, although
it will remain imperative for entirely domestic arbitrations." How-
ever, this outcome is not imposed by the 1958 New York Conven-
tion. It depends solely on the attitude of municipal legislation and
97. Grigera Na6n, Public Policy and International Commercial Arbitration: The Ar-
gentine Perspective, 3 J. INr'L Aiw. 7-27 (1986).
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courts, and in fact, may be adopted even without signing the 1958
New York Convention. On the contrary, if the arbitration ordered
by the national court applying Article II of the 1958 New York
Convention is to take place abroad, the need for a "compromiso"
will be exclusively determined by the law of the foreign country
where the arbitration. takes place.
2. The Panama Convention
Similar distinctions can be drawn with respect to analogous
provisions in Article 1 of the Panama Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration. It must be noted, however, that this pro-
vision only establishes the validity of arbitral agreements. It does
not provide for the referral of the dispute to the arbitrators as does
Article II of the 1958 New York Convention. Therefore, it remains
unclear whether this provision will have the effect of allowing en-
forcement through specific performance of arbitral agreements.
Moreover, it is still uncertain whether upon the ratification of this
Convention, countries not allowing specific performance of arbitral
agreements will see their legislation changed. Indeed, the reasona-
ble interpretation is that specific performance would be permit-
ted." These and other shortcomings of this Convention are per-
haps the consequences of the excessively "hasty and unorthodox"
procedure observed in its approval, without "major study and con-
sideration of the problems involved.""
Another interpretation is based on the fact that Article 3 of
the Panama Convention provides that the arbitration will be gov-
erned by the Arbitral Rules of the Interamerican Commission on
Commercial Arbitration absent any contrary decision by the par-
ties. Since these Rules do not require the execution of a "com-
promiso" their application pursuant to article 3 of the Panama
Convention could render the latter unnecessary.10
It may be also inferred from the fact that Article 21 of these
Rules authorizes arbitrators to decide on their own jurisdiction
(even if the validity or existence of the arbitral agreement has been
challenged) that they implicitly exclude the "compromiso." Cer-
tainly, it is difficult to reconcile such broad arbitral powers with
98. van den Berg, supra note 91, at 138-39.
99. G. PARA ARANGUREN, CODIFICACION DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO EN
AMMCA 309, 313, 333 (1982).
100. van den Berg, supra note 91, at 140-41.
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the need for a court-enforced "compromiso." This, because it is
unlikely that the courts would take such action without first decid-
ing on the validity and existence of the arbitral agreement on
which the claim for specific performance is based.
It is doubtful, however, that the Rules, originally addressed
only to the parties and the arbitrators, would bring about the dero-
gation of the existing mandatory rules of the member countries
which are also addressed to the courts. The original text of Article
3 of the Convention, suggested by the Interamerican Law Commit-
tee, provided that the Rules would apply only in so far as they do
not infringe upon the public policy of the country where the arbi-
tration took place. This provision was not adopted. Nevertheless, it
may be adduced that the Rules can not be applied in violation of
fundamental procedural principles or mechanisms of such country.
This may be concluded in view of Article 1(2) of the Rules them-
selves which provides that the latter cannot prevail over
mandatory rules of the law applicable to the arbitration."'1
3. Advantages of the Compromiso
The fact that the Panama Convention refers to the Rules does
not necessarily displace the application of the mandatory rules of
procedure in the country where the arbitral proceeding takes place.
The mandatory rules require the execution of a "compromiso" un-
less, as suggested before, the courts of such country decide, on case
by case basis that the "compromiso" is not required for an interna-
101. Actas y Documentos de la Conferencia Especializada Interamericana sobre Der-
echo Internacional Privado, 2 O.E.A. (Ser. k, 21.1) 213, 214 (1975). An additional reason is
that these Rules and their modifications are not drafted or approved by the state party to
the 1975 Panama Convention but by the Inter-American Commission on Commercial Arbi-
tration, which functions within the framework of the Organization of American States. The
Rules in force when the Convention was made were replaced by new Rules of January 1,
1978. Although, upon ratifying the Convention, any country may introduce a reservation
stating that it only accepts the rules in force on the date of ratification and any successive
changes expressly accepted by it, it is difficult to admit even in the absence of such reserva-
tion that the Rules, present or future, may derogate from procedural rules of the member
country based on public policy considerations of the forum. Section 306 of H.R. 4314 in-
troduces a new Chapter 3 into Title 9 of the U.S. Code in order to implement this Conven-
tion. It came into effect upon the entry into force of the Convention with respect to the
United States. See infra note 167. It provides that the rules of procedure of the Inter-Amer-
ican Commercial Arbitration Commission referred to in article 3 of the Convention shall be
those promulgated by the Commission on July 1, 1988, and that the Secretary of State may
prescribe that future modifications or amendments of the rules introduced by the Commis-
sion become effective with respect to the United States for the purposes of new Chapter 3,
Title 9, of the U.S. Code. H.R. 4314, 101st Cong., 2d Ses. §306, 136 CONG. REc. 3106 (1990).
1991)
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
tional arbitration within its jurisdiction.
The elimination of the "compromiso" and the maintenance of
the claim and answer to the claim and counterclaim, bring arbitra-
tion closer to the adversarial process that normally takes place
before state courts. Indeed, this seems to fit with the present state
of arbitral adjudication. It is increasingly felt that arbitration is a
"fight oriented" proceeding like normal adversarial adjudication,
rather than a means of facilitating the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes or an adequate mechanism for inducing the parties to reach
compromise and leave aside short-sighted antagonisms. The par-
ties involved in arbitration are no longer seeking a compromise or
settlement but want to wage a war with the adversary culminating
in all-out victory.102
The "compromiso" promotes the idea that arbitration requires
a more cooperative attitude by the parties and a less antagonistic
approach to the resolution of their disputes. It compels the parties
to sit together, face-to-face, in order to determine, and record in
writing, the controversial issues and the arguments on which their
respective positions are based. This step also allows the parties to
weigh the nature, importance, and implications (economic or oth-
erwise) of the dispute. It thus affords an unparalleled opportunity
to assess their respective chances of success before first blood has
been shed.
The "compromiso" stands for the principle that arbitration is
not, at its inception, an all-out declaration of war. By signing the
arbitral agreement, the parties jointly participate in the drafting of
a document (the "compromiso"), in the course of which initially
antagonistic attitudes may abate and, as a result, a peaceful settle-
ment of the dispute may be reached before arbitral proceedings
have really started. This exercise is an appropriate way of forcing
the parties to make a sober evaluation and comparison of their re-
spective positions and claims. It allows a precise determination of
the real points of conflict. The process of making the "com-
promiso" might thus facilitate the termination of the dispute
through negotiations, based on a realistic appraisal of reciprocal
strengths and weaknesses, before arbitration and its ensuing ex-
pense begins.
102. Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-Five Years, in LImER
AMICORUM FOR LORD WILBERFORCE 149, 181 (1987); Grigera Na6n, International Commer-
cial Arbitration: Realities and Perspectives, 5 J. INT'L ARe. 5-7 (1988).
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This is consistent with the alleged aims of arbitration, if one
does not view it entirely as an adversarial process. Indeed, the al-
ternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement in the United States
tries to induce the parties to participate in proceedings not neces-
sarily leading to a final and binding decision susceptible to com-
pulsory enforcement. In the course of such proceedings, the parties
learn more about the true nature, justification, and prospects of
real success of their respective claims. As a result, they may realis-
tically conclude that settlement is the best way of resolving their
differences or that no real, substantial conflict exists. 03
In addition, according to certain opinions, the "compromiso"
is surrounded with certain formalities for fear that errors or omis-
sions in determining certain basic aspects of the arbitral procedure
might lead to an unjust or biased decision. It is a last pause for
reflection and evaluation, in face of the concrete dispute, where the
parties may still take precautions in shaping their private adjudi-
catory process, already beyond the protective reach of natural
judges.1"4 Also, by eliminating from the outset the possibility of in-
troducing separate claims and counterclaims and the raising of
questions or defenses not expressly included in the "compromiso"
(once it has been executed), the "compromiso" is supposed to con-
tribute decisively to the swiftness of arbitral proceedings. For in-
stance, if an issue is not contemplated in the "compromiso" as one
to be resolved, the parties may not introduce it once the "com-
promiso" has been executed. The "compromiso" forces the parties
to establish their arguments and positions in both substantial and
procedural matters from the outset.' 3
If, due to the foregoing reasons, Latin American legislators are
to maintain the "compromiso," it is vital to improve substantially
the way in which it is regulated. One such improvement to con-
sider is allowing a party whose opponent is recalcitrant toward the
"compromiso," to resort to the courts for having the "compromiso"
extended after both parties have been heard on the existance and
validity of an arbitral agreement. The court should limit itself to
ascertaining whether a valid arbitral agreement exists between the
103. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 668-82 (1986); Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62
Tui. L. REV. 1 (1987).
104. A. FARHI & A. FARH,, supra note 80, at 17.
105. L. PLcio, supra note 18; Gabald6n, supra note 15, at 77; Grigera Na6n, La Ley
Modelo sobre Arbitraje Comercial Internacional y el Derecho Argentino, 31 L.L. 5 (1989).
1991]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
parties (without exploring whether there is an existing dispute fall-
ing within its scope) and immediately call for a hearing where both
parties can establish their positions concerning the substance or
signature of the "compromiso." After that, even if the recalcitrant
party has not appeared, the court should issue a final and binding
decision, not subject to any appeal or review, determining the sub-
stance and text of the "compromiso" and designating the arbitra-
tor corresponding to the recalcitrant party, along with the third
arbitrator, if necessary. If the existence of a dispute falling within
the scope of the arbitral agreement is questioned, such a matter
should be included in the "compromiso" as one of the issues sub-
mitted to the arbitrators. A better alternative (though probably
more expensive since it makes the payment of arbitral fees inevita-
ble) is to allow the court to designate the arbitrators according to
the terms of the arbitral agreement (if the parties fail to do so) and
refer all matters to them concerning the drawing up of the "com-
promiso" once convinced that a valid arbitral agreement exists.
E. Nationality of Arbitrators
Few Latin American statutes require that all arbitrators be
nationals of the forum country.' In some cases, restrictions apply
only to legal arbitration and not to equitable arbitration or amiable
composition.'01 The reason for that often stems from the fact that
legal arbitrators are lawyers entitled to practice in the forum and
must be nationals of the country where the arbitral tribunal is sit-
ting.' Thus, the nationality requirement would only apply to ar-
bitrations held within the territory of a specific country and has no
extra-territorial public policy effect vis-d-vis arbitrations taking
place abroad to which nationals or domiciliaries of such countries
are parties. On the other hand, in some countries (such as Ecua-
dor) having the nationality requirement even for equitable adjudi-
cation, it is accepted that the requirement will not apply if the
arbitration is subject to foreign institutional arbitration rules (for
106. Colombia: Diaz Rubio, supro note 15, at 60. When the dispute concerns Colombi-
ans, with respect to contracts to be performed in Colombia, see Decree 2279, supra note 11,
art. 9. Ecuador: Decree No. 735 art. 3 of Oct. 23, 1963, reprinted in Ecuadorian Law on
Commercial Arbitration, 1 WORLD A. REP. 1533 (1987). This is also a requirement under
the general procedural laws of Ecuador. C. LRREATEGUI, supra note 15, at 96.
107. Chile: Eyzaguirre Echeverria, supra note 19, at 48. Venezuela: See Gonz6Iez,
supra note 85, at 624.
108. ARarriRui CompEsci., supra note 27, at 44-45 (indicating that this requirement,
existing in Chile, has no practical application).
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example the ICC Rules).1" ' It must be stated that this requirement
will not apply to international arbitrations held in countries par-
ties to the 1975 Panama Convention since Article 2 expressly pro-
vides that arbitrators may be either nationals or foreigners.
F. Leave to Enforce and Means of Recourse
With the exception of Brazil 10and Mexico1 leave from a local
court is not needed to enforce an arbitral award. In some countries,
a formal filing before a notary public, a court, or a court official is
required merely as a formality. It does not open the possibility of
review or the setting aside of the award. 1 2 As a rule, the arbitral
award may be enforced from the moment it has been rendered. In
other countries, such as Argentina, courts have established that
even if an action has been filed to set aside a legal or equitable
award on procedural grounds, enforcement of the award is neither
precluded nor suspended. 1 3
Under non-treaty law in Argentina, an action to set aside an
award because it was beyond the scope of the arbitral agreement,
because the time for making it expired, or because of a substantial
procedural error is considered an extraordinary means of recourse.
The courts have held that the enforcement of the award is not sus-
pended while this means of recourse is pending. The situation dif-
fers in the case of an ordinary appeal filed against the award and
specifically aimed at reviewing it on the merits. This type of appeal
would suspend the award. However, such an appeal is not available
in most cases because it may be waived in de jure or legal arbitra-
109. Jim6nez Salazar, supra note 15, at 80 (using the ICC Rules as an example).
110. C6Dvo CIVIL [C.C.] art. 1045 (Braz.).
111. Hoagland, supra note 24, at 97.
112. Colombia: Decree 2279, supra note 11, art. 35; Diaz Rubio, supra note 15, at 65.
Ecuador. Jim~nez Salazar, supra note 15, at 84-85. Paraguay: C6D. PROC. CiV. art. 811
(Para.).
113. See generally C61). PROC. Civ. Y Com. arts. 758, 760, 771 (Argen.); N. Gowland,
IMPUGNACI6N DEL LAUDO AmrBRAL 38, 39 (1950); ALSINA, 7 TRATADO Tz6aIco PRACTICO DR
DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL Y COMERCIAL 79 (1965); R. FERNANDEZ, I C6DIGO DE
PaocEDimmNTo CVIL. ComENrADo 631, 635 (1955); contra E. Anaya, Juicio Arbitral, 4 BOLE-
TIN DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO Y CIENCIAS SOCIALES DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE C6RDOBA 33
(1968); T. JoFR9, 4 MANUAL DE PROCEDIMIENTO CnIL Y PENAL 209-10 (1923). Most decisions
denying suspensive effects to the means for attacking the award concern actions for setting
aside equitable or amiable composition awards. F. Rosenbusch, Recursos y Acciones Contra
el Laudo Arbitral; Causales de Nulidad del Mismo, 76 J.A. 735-39 (1941); Judgment of July
5, 1946, Ckmara Comercial de ia Capital, Argen., 43 L.L. 613; Di Rico v. Salomone, 1925-38
L.L. 167-68; Fried, G. v. Strauss, F., 1937-58 J.A. 587-89.
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tions and it is not allowed against "amiable composition" or equi-
table awards.
In Brazil, the prior homologation by a local court is required
to enforce awards rendered in Brazil. The homologation may be
refused on a number of grounds: Violation of public policy, the
submission is null and void, the award went beyond the limits
traced by the "compromiso," or the homologation was not
timely."" This requirement lends itself to criticism, because it in-
troduces an additional procedural requirement that is not justified
where other procedural means (such as appeal or setting aside) are
available for attacking awards which violate certain principles. In
fact, current Brazilian draft legislation on the topic eliminates the
homologation requirement. 116 However, confirmation of domestic
awards does not necessarily indicate a hostile signal toward arbi-
tration and may be viewed as an appropriate safeguard for arbitral
adjudication.
The Netherlands 1986 Arbitration Act prescribes a "leave for
enforcement" system for all arbitral awards rendered in Dutch ter-
ritory.11 On the other hand, English authorities maintain that,
with or without exclusion clauses, an English court will never en-
force an award which violates general principles of natural justice
114. After homologation, the award has the same effect as a court decision and provides
the plaintiff with an enforceable instrument opening the way for execution proceedings.
C.P.C. art. 1079 (Braz.). Prior to homologation, the award is publicly communicated to the
parties and filed with the secretary of the tribunal. The latter will give a copy of the award
to each party and submits, within five days, the arbitral file to the competent judge (the
judge who would have decided the dispute if no arbitral agreement existed) for homologa-
tion purposes. Id. art. 1096. In theory, the judge has 10 days to pronounce on the homologa-
tion. Id. arts. 1098-1099. Homologation is denied if the award is null and void under any of
the grounds listed in article 1100 or violates public policy. Id. art. 1100. If homologation is
given, an appeal (apelacao) having suspensive effects may still be introduced against the
homologation judgment for the same grounds set out at article 1100. This means of appeal
may not be waived. Id. arts. 1101-1102; Marotta Rangel, supra note 15, at 42-43.
115. Pestalozzi, supra note 87, at 137.
116. P. SANDERS & A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 8, at 36-43. A Dutch court may refuse
leave for enforcement if the award is contrary to public policy or good morals. Even if leave
for enforcement is granted, the award is still open to setting aside proceedings within three
months if the award and leave for enforcement have been served on the party filing the
means of setting aside. The grounds for setting aside include the following situations: where
there is no valid arbitral agreement, where the arbitral award is in violation of the estab-
lished procedure or beyond the issues submitted to arbitration, or where it is contrary to
public policy or good morals. The award may also be revoked if it is based on fraud or
forgery or if the other party withheld documents only known after the award is given. Revo-
cation is possible within three months from the date these facts are known to the party
requesting it. Id. Netherlands 1986 Arbitration Act arts. 1064-1068.
LATIN AMERICAN ARBITRATION
or public policy."1 7 This rule applies even if the award was ren-
dered in England and is not subject to appeal or attack. Basically,
this stands for the proposition that an English court will not
render enforceable or homologate awards, however final they might
be, if it feels that certain fundamental principles have been
violated.
G. Powers of Arbitrators and Separability of the Arbitration
Clause
Legislation in most Latin American countries provides for
court support in appointing arbitrators, if any of the parties fails
to do so, and for the facilitation of arbitral proceedings.1 " How-
ever, like elsewhere, Latin American arbitrators are normally pre-
vented from decreeing any measures, interim or otherwise, leading
to the compulsory enforcement of the award.119 The interested
party must resort to the courts before, or during, the arbitral pro-
ceedings to have the interim measure decreed and enforced. In this
regard, a solution such as the one set out at the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which allows
interim measures of protection to be granted either by the arbitra-
tors or by the courts, should be adopted by Latin American legisla-
tors. This should be implemented with respect to both domestic
and international disputes.'2 0
Some Latin American laws do show, however, a surprisingly
modern attitude in this regard. For instance, article 4(e) of Argen-
117. Under English law, an award may be set aside if the arbitrator never had jurisdic-
tion, was not qualified to act as arbitrator, decided the case beyond the scope of his powers,
or failed to apply the rules of natural justice. Steyn, Report on England, 8 Y.B. COM. Ann.
30-31 (1983).
118. C6D. PRoc. Civ. v COM. arts. 743, 753 (Argen.); C6D. PRoc. Civ. arts. 717, 726 (Bol.);
C6D. ORG. TRm. art. 232 (Chile); see Decree 2279, supra note 11, art. 9 (Colom.); Dlaz Rubio,
supra note 15, at 62 (Colom.) ; C6D Paoc. Civ. arts. 823, 827 (Para.); C6D. PROC. Civ. arts.
551, 556, 567; C.F.P.C. arts. 222, 616, 626 (Mex.); C6D. CoM. art. 1418 (Mex.); Briseflo Sierra,
supra note 15, at 99; C6D. PROC. Civ. art. 548 (Uru.); C6D. PRoc. Civ. art. 610(2) (Vener.).
See also El Salvador : C6D. PROC. art. 75(El Sal.); Honduras: C6D PRoc. art. 870 (Hond.);
Guatemala: C6D. PRoc. art. 288 (Guat.)(all providing for court support in order to obtain
evidence to be produced before the arbitral tribunal). AmsniTRA COMERCIAL Y LABORAL RN
AMzmCA CSnTsAL 82-83 (A. Garro ed. 1990).
119. Argentina: C6D. PROC. Cirv. v COM. art. 753 (Argen.). Bolivia: C6D. PRoc. Cirv. art.
726. Brazil: C.P.C. arts. 1086-1087. Mexico: Briseflo Sierra, supra note 15, at 100-01.
However, it seems that in Ecuador, the arbitrators may order the sequestration or de-
tention of goods in dispute. Jim~nez Salazar, supra note 15, at 83.
120. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Comercial Arbitration, Annex 1 arts. 9,
17(3), U.N. Doc. A/46/17 (1985).
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tine Decree 1918 of 1981, governing arbitrations within the context
of Argentine grain market associations, authorizes the arbitral
panel to grant or decree interim measures of protection in the
course of the arbitration to ensure the enforcement of the future
award.' According to article 32 of Colombian Decree 2279 of 1989
which introduced new arbitration law, if the dispute submitted to
arbitration concerns property rights or any other real rights in
movables or immovables, the arbitral tribunal may order that the
pendency of arbitral proceedings be recorded in that property's
record of title or its equivalent.12 2 As a result, a third party is made
aware that any rights he may acquire on such property is subject
to the outcome of the arbitration. This provision also authorizes
the arbitral tribunal to order the sequestration of movable prop-
erty pending the outcome of the arbitration.
In most Latin American countries, there are opinions uphold-
ing the independence of the arbitral agreement from the underly-
ing transaction and affirming the power of arbitrators to decide on
their own jurisdiction (Kompetenz-Kompetenz).'13 Both principles
are crucial for swift and unencumbered arbitration.
The legislation of some Latin American countries, including
Colombia'2 4 and Mexico,125 makes it clear that the incorporation of
the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle is indissolubly related to the
autonomy of the arbitral agreement. On the other hand, in Argen-
tina, 26 it is a generally accepted principle that once a voluntary
submission to arbitration has taken place without the arbitrators'
lack of jurisdiction being raised, the issue is precluded from being
raised in a court of law.
121. Decreto Ley 1918, 41-D A.D.L.A. 4114 (Argen.)(1981) (hereinafter Decree 19181.
122. Decree 2279, supra note 11, art. 32.
123. Argentina: Grigera Na6n, supra note 15, at 11. Brazil: Marotta Rangel, supra note
15, at 35. Chile: Eyzaguirre Echeverria, supra note 19, at 48; cf. Aylwin Azocar, supra note
81, at 444-49 (contending that arbitrators may only decide on the scope of their powers, and
only if the arbitral tribunal has already been constituted). Colombia: Diaz Rubio, supra note
15, at 60. Ecuador. C. LARREATEGUI, supra note 15, at 107. In the case of Ecuador, article 16
of the Ley de Arbitraje Comercial provides that the arbitral tribunal has exclusive jurisdic-
tion to decide whether its acts are null and void, in full or in part, even if the issue has not
been raised by any of the parties. Peru: Aramburu Menchaca, supra note 34, at 116, 121.
Venezuela: Gabald6n, supra note 15, at 74.
124. Decree 2279, supra note 11, art. 29.
125. C6D. COM. art. 1051, para. 2 (Mex.); Hoagland, supra note 24, at 94; C.F.P.C. art.
630 (Mex.); Briseflo Sierra, El Arbitraje Comercial en Mkxico, in Liber Amicorum Zubkow-
ski, supra note 14, at 367-71.
126. Judgment of June 23, 1975, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n (C.J.N.],
Argen., 1975-D L.L. 394.
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If the arbitration agreement were not independent from the
underlying transaction, questioning the latter's validity would pre-
vent the immediate effectiveness of the arbitral clause until the
preliminary issue of the transaction's validity is decided by adjudi-
cators (most likely a state court) not designated under the arbitral
clause. If arbitrators cannot decide on the scope of their adjudica-
tory powers, any objection regarding the validity of the arbitral
agreement would have to be decided by a state court, not by the
arbitral tribunal. In the interim, arbitration proceedings would be
suspended with ensuing delay. It is obvious that these scenarios
give ample opportunity for a party acting in bad faith to obstruct
arbitral proceedings.
These issues are extremely important to the existence and fu-
ture of arbitration. The absence of Latin American court decisions
on this point and the lack of doctrinal opinions or interpretations
of the existing law leave this point unresolved. The independence
of the arbitral agreement and the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle
have not been accepted in national laws with the degree of perma-
nence and predictability that lawyers and merchants involved in
local and international commerce require.
In Argentina, the situation is blurred and needs some clarifica-
tion. Some court decisions suggest that the arbitral clause is not
independent of the main contract since the arbitrators cease to
have jurisdiction if the validity or existence of the contract is ques-
tioned. 2' The solution supported by the majority seems to be that
only if the existence or validity of the arbitral clause itself is at-
tacked are the arbitrators deprived ab initio of jurisdiction to de-
cide on such issues. 2 ' Also, if the arbitrability of the dispute is
127. T. JOFRf, 4 MANUAL DE PROCEDIMIENTO CIVIL Y PENAL 203-04 (1923) (denying juris-
diction to the arbitrators only if the existence of the contract where the arbitral stipulation
is inserted is denied); Judgment of July 30, 1965, Cimara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo
Comercial de Ia Capital Federal, Argen., 120 L.L. 322. Only if the parties expressly allowed
the arbitrators to decide on the existence and validity of the contract, would they be enti-
tled to do so. A. FARHm & A. FARui, supra note 80, at 76; see Judgment of Sept. 30, 1955,
C&mara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial de la Capital Federal, Argen., 82 L.L. 403.
128. Grigera Na6n, El Arbitraje Comercial en el Derecho Argentino Interno e Interna-
cional Privado, 163 REvisTA DE DYazcHo MERCANcrL, Madrid, 115, 117-18 (1982). In Argen-
tina, it would be a preliminary question to be resolved by the courts under the Code of Civil
Procedure, article 752. Under this provision, until the preliminary question is resolved, arbi-
tral proceedings are not suspended, though the making of the award must wait until a final
court decision. The solution in Brazil is similar, though arbitral proceedings are totally sus-
pended until the preliminary question is resolved. C.P.C. art. 1094 (Braz.). In Venezuela, if
there is disagreement between the arbitrators on the interpretation of the compromiso or on
any procedural rule, the issue must be submitted to and resolved by the first instance court.
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questioned, the issue is decided by the courts and not by the arbi-
trators."2 9 If matters submitted to arbitration and matters falling
under court jurisdiction are closely related, the courts consider
themselves competent to decide all issues. Consequently, arbitral
jurisdiction is denied.'30
Opinions in Argentina differ as to whether an arbitrator can
decide on the scope of his own jurisdiction. Court decisions have
allowed arbitrators to do so by determining the scope of their pow-
ers through the interpretation of an already existing "com-
promiso." It has also been held that if the arbitral agreement
broadly refers all disputes to arbitration, it is not within the
court's authority, when asked to draw a pending "compromiso" for
the recalcitrant party, to determine if the dispute falls under the
arbitral agreement. The decision on this issue must be left to the
arbitrators themselves. Otherwise, there would be an invasion of
the arbitrators' jurisdiction.' 1 Most likely, if it is alleged that arbi-
tration is not possible because of public policy reasons or because
the subject-matter of the dispute cannot be compromised, the arbi-
trators are prevented from making any decision as to their own
jurisdiction. The issue must then be considered a preliminary one
to be decided by state courts.'
In the present state of Argentine law, if one of the parties re-
sorts to a court for the drawing up of the "compromiso," the court
may consider the following factors in deciding if the arbitral agree-
ment is valid: (i) whether the arbitral agreement is contrary to
Such a court's decision is not subject to appeal. C6D. PRoc. Civ. art. 618(2) (Venez.). This
provision is an unnecessary limitation to the scope of arbitral jurisdiction on matters which
do not concern the arbitrability of the dispute or the validity of the arbitral agreement and
which should be solely decided by the arbitrators. On the other hand, the arbitral tribunal
must be composed of an uneven number of arbitrators. C6D. PRoc. Civ. art. 608 (Venez).
That being the case, no deadlock is possible, and it is then hard to understand why the
arbitral tribunal is not authorized to decide by itself all the issues referred to at article
618(2), unless they touch upon the arbitrability of the dispute or the validity of the arbitral
agreement.
129. Judgment of Aug. 3, 1918, Chmara Federal de Apelaciones, Argen., 128 Fallos 402;
Cfrmara Federal, Gaceta del Foro VII, Mar.-Apr. 1922, at 95-96; Judgment of July 28, 1954,
Com. Sala A, 76 L.L. 324; Judgment of July 31, 1948, Cam. Nac. Com., 52 L.L. 23; see
Grigera Na6n, supra note 128, at 117-18 (1982); A. FAHRI & A. FAHi, supra note 80; L.
PALACIO, supra note 18, at 116.
130. Judgment of Sept. 10, 1952, Cmara Nacional Comercial, Argen., 70 L.L. 50-52.
131. Judgment of Oct. 29, 1926, CAmara Comercial de Is Capital, Argen., 22 J.A. 1177;
see also Chmara 2a., Civil y Comercial de La Plata, Argen., 1945-I J.A. 725 (with a critical
comment by R. Reimundin).
132. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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public policy, mandatory rules, or concerns a non-arbitrable sub-
ject-matter; (ii) whether the consent of the parties to the arbitral
agreement is vitiated; and (iii) whether the parties had the capac-
ity to enter into the arbitral agreement. The arbitrators should de-
clare themselves incompetent to decide such issues if included in
the "compromiso" or if otherwise raised before them. Any other
issue (such as whether there is a dispute falling within the scope of
the arbitral agreement or whether the contract subject to arbitra-
tion exists or is valid) should be included by the court as disputed
issues falling under the "compromiso" and submitted to the arbi-
tral tribunal for adjudication. However, as already indicated, if the
court is called upon to grant a "compromiso" through specific per-
formance, certain courts might take it upon themselves to decide
whether the dispute falls within the scope of the arbitral
agreement.'33
Unfortunately, the absence in Argentina of clear and articulate
notions on the separability of the arbitral clause and on the
Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle (as well as legal texts incorporat-
ing these concepts) aids to the confusion. It does not help that
some of the decisions that attempt to promote these principles
may be considered obiter dicta.134 This situation has been aggra-
vated by a recent decision of the Argentine Supreme Court of Jus-
tice, '35 casting new doubts on both the separability of the arbitral
clause and the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle. The case in-
volved an arbitration between Argentine parties regarding a con-
tract for the sale of corn and soybean. The proceeding was com-
menced before the arbitral tribunal of the Argentine Grain Market
Association (Bolsa Argentina de Cereales).
According to article 31 of Decree Law 6698/63136 governing ar-
bitrations before the Argentine Grain Market Association, the dis-
pute submitted to arbitration must arise from a contract for the
sale of grains or grain subproducts. 1 7 Under article 4(5) of Decree
1918 of 1981 regulating arbitrations before Argentine grain market
associations (c~maras argentinas de cereales), arbitrations within
133. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. See also supra note 132 and accompa-
nying text.
134. Judgment of Sept. 26, 1988, Chnara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial "E",
Argen., L.L., Nov. 2, 1989, at 5-6; Grigera Na6n, The Scope of the Separability of the Arbi-
tration Agreement Under Argentine Law, I AM. REv. INT'L Aaa. 261 (1990).
135. Judgment of Feb. 2, 1990, C.J.N, Argen., 27 L.L. N. 24, 1-3 (1990).




the context of a grain association require prior filing of the dis-
puted sales contract with the respective grain market
association. 188
In court, the defendant in the arbitration proceedings ques-
tioned the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal by alleging that the
underlying transaction was not actually a contract for the sale of
grains, but rather a loan agreement. Accordingly, despite the broad
and all-encompassing wording of the arbitral clause, the dispute
would not fall within its scope or the powers of the arbitral tribu-
nal. The defendant contended that the tribunal may only decide
disputes relating to contracts for the sale of grains. If this latter
characterization is challenged, the arbitral tribunal would be de-
prived of jurisdiction and should therefore stay its proceedings.
The intervening court accepted the defendant's arguments,
declared itself competent to decide the dispute, and addressed a
communication to the arbitral tribunal pursuant to article 9 of the
Procedural Code. This communication invited the tribunal to stay
arbitral proceedings and to transfer the case to the court. Accord-
ing to article 10 of the Procedural Code, a judge invited to transfer
the case to another judge may either do so or uphold its jurisdic-
tion and send the case to a superior court to decide the conflicting
jurisdictional issues. 130
The court, however, was obviously mistaken in resorting to ar-
ticles 9 and 10 of the Procedural Code since they only apply to
situations where two or more judges attempt to exercise jurisdic-
tion over the same case." 0 Neither the letter nor the spirit of these
provisions suggests that they apply to jurisdictional clashes be-
tween courts and arbitral tribunals. Under article 752 of the Ar-
gentine Procedural Code, the only effective way courts may stay
arbitral proceedings is if the arbitrability of the dispute is ques-
tioned, if it is alleged that the substance of the dispute may not be
subject to settlement or compromise between the parties, or if an
essential prerequisite to the commencement of arbitral proceedings
or the execution of the "compromiso" is pending."" None of the
above situations were present in the case. The subject matter of
the dispute was obviously susceptible to compromise or settlement,
138. See Decree 1918, supra note 121, art. 4(5).
139. Cer. PROC. Civ. Y CoM. art. 10 (Argen.).
140. Id. arts. 9, 10.
141. C6D. PRoC. Civ. Y. CoM. art. 742 (Argen.).
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and according to article 37 of Decree Law 6698/6312 and article 7
of Decree 1918,148 arbitrations before grain market associations are
free from the prerequisite of the "compromiso." Even if this were
not the case, the intervening court may not resort to articles 9-10.
Rather, at the request of the interested party the court should is-
sue an interim measure ordering the freeze of arbitral proceedings
until the arbitrability question is decided or the "compromiso" is
validly executed by the intervening court.
In this case, the arbitral tribunal rightly chose to maintain its
jurisdiction and refused to transfer the case. However, instead of
continuing the arbitral proceedings, the arbitral tribunal decided
to observe the path provided by articles 9 and 10. It stayed the
arbitration, and sent the case for further review of the jurisdic-
tional issue to the superior court having jurisdiction over both the
court and the arbitral tribunal. " This court, the Argentine Su-
preme Court of Justice, approved of the transfer. Thus, it would
seem that the decision of the arbitral tribunal to maintain its juris-
diction is jeopardized, notwithstanding the independence of the ar-
bitral clause from the underlying transaction. Therefore, it appears
that a party could stay the arbitral process simply by challenging
in court the jurisdiction of the arbitral panel, at least until the Ar-
gentine Supreme Court decides on the jurisdictional issue. It is in-
teresting to note that scholars from other countries would concur
with this decision and endorse the procedural path followed by
both the lower court and the arbitral panel which denied the arbi-
trators Kompetenz-Kompetenz powers to decide their own
jurisdiction.1 5
Based on the foregoing, it appears that legislation in this area
is urgently needed in Argentina and other Latin American coun-
tries to incorporate the principles of independence of the arbitral
clause and arbitral Kompetenz-Kompetenz as well as to reasonably
limit their application whenever circumstances of strong public
policy so require. As far as international arbitration is concerned,
the 1975 Panama Convention provides that arbitration is to be
governed by the Rules of the Interamerican Commission of Com-
mercial Arbitration in the absence of a different choice by the par-
ties. Article 3 of the Convention applies article 21 of these Rules
142. See Decree 6698/68, aupra note 136.
143. See Decree 1918, supra note 123.
144. The arbitral interlocutory award is published at L.L. No. 24, Feb. 2, 1990, at 1-2.
145. This is the case in Chile. P. AYLwwN AZOCAR, supra note 81, at 449-51.
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and explicitly establishes the autonomy of the arbitral agreement
and authorizes the arbitrators to decide on their own jurisdiction.
This, even if the validity or existence of the arbitral agreement or
contract is questioned. However, as previously indicated, "" the ap-
plication of the Rules under the Convention cannot preempt public
policy rules and principles of the member countries that may have
an impact on the determination of the arbitrators' jurisdiction
(such as the validity of the arbitral agreement or the arbitrability
of the dispute) and which solely entrust decisions on these issues
to the courts.
III. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN AWARDS
As a rule, the same legal provisions that govern the enforce-
ment of foreign court decisions apply to the enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards in Latin American countries. In some countries,
such as Argentina, a specific provision nullifies the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards made by arbitrators sitting abroad under
an invalid foreign arbitration clause. Such a clause will not be valid
under the following circumstances: i) if it concerns non-arbitrable
subject-matter under Argentine law, ii) if the transaction subject
to arbitration is non-patrimonial in nature or wholly domestic, iii)
if the dispute falls exclusively under the jurisdiction of Argentine
courts, or iv) if a specific legal provision excludes the disputed is-
sues submitted to arbitration from foreign adjudication. In addi-
tion, the foreign award must meet certain requirements applicable
to the enforcement of foreign court decisions listed in the proce-
dural code. 147 In general terms, legal provisions governing the rec-
ognition and enforcement of foreign awards in Latin American
countries are not very different from those existing in other coun-
tries. Most Latin American legislations limit the enforcement of
judgments where the parties are from different countries. An
award made outside' the country must not infringe the forum's
public policy and must comply with due process (i.e., the defend-
ant was notified of the proceedings and was given the opportunity
to defend himself). In addition, the arbitration tribunal cannot in-
terfere with the exclusive jurisdiction of forum courts or seek to
decide a case already decided locally by a court or arbitrator. 14 8
146. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
147. C6D. PROC. Civ. Y CoM. arts. 517-19 (Argen.). For such requirements, see infra note
148 and accompanying text.
148. Argentina: C6D. PROC. CiV. Y Cou. arts. 517, 519 (Argen.); Bolivia: C6D. PROC. CiV.
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A. Certain Problematic Aspects of Enforcement in Latin
America
Notwithstanding the progress made by Latin American coun-
tries, one must still admit that certain aspects of existing law on
the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards could
be improved. For example, under many national court systems, the
recognition and enforcement of foreign awards by the forum is
contingent on the reciprocal treatment of the enforcement abroad
of awards rendered in such forum.' Though the reciprocity re-
quirement is not always a dramatic requirement,50 arbitration
would be better served without it.
Nevertheless, many jurisdictions are eliminating a blanket rec-
arts. 552, 555, 556 (Bol.). Chile: C61. ORG. THm. arts. 245-246 (Chile). Colombia: Diaz Rubio,
supra note 15, at 68-69. Ecuador: COD. PRoc. Civ. art. 451 (Ecuador). Mexico: C.F.P.C. art.
606 (Mex.); COD. Com. art. 1347-A (Mex.); Briseijo Sierra, supra note 15, at 105. Paraguay:
COD. PRoc. Civ. arts. 532, 536 (Para.). Peru: COD. Civ. art. 2104 (Peru); CO. PROC. CIv. art.
1159 (Peru). Uruguay: COD. PRoc. Crv. arts. 514-515 (Uru.). Venezuela: COD. PROC. Civ. art.
851 (Venez.); Montevideo Treaty on International Procedural Law, 1889, art. 5 (ratified by
Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay, and acceded to by Colombia) [hereinafter
1889 Montevideo Treaty]; Montevideo Treaty on International Procedural Law, Mar. 19,
1940, art. 5 (ratified by Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay), reprinted in HUDSON, INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGISLATION 472 (1949) [hereinafter 1940 Montevideo Treaty]; Bustamante Code,
Convention on Private International Law, Feb. 20, 1928, arts. 423, 432, 86 L.N.T.S. 246
(ratified by Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Brazil,
Chile, Honduras, Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, El Salvador, and Venezuela) [hereinafter
Bustamante Code]; Bolivian Treaty, July 18, 1911, art. 5 (ratified by Ecuador, Bolivia, Co-
lombia, Venezuela, and Peru) [hereinafter Bolivian Treaty]; Inter-American Convention on
Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, May 8, 1979, art. 2, 51
U.N.T.S. 1 (ratified by Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Vene-
zuela) [hereinafter Inter-American Treaty]. Kos-Rabcewicz-Zubkowski, Les Conventions In-
teram~ricaines sur l'Arbitrage Commercial et la Commission Internationale Interam~ri-
caine d'Arbitroge Commercial, 4 REV. ARB. 411-22 (1983).
149. Bolivia: COD. PRoc. Civ. arts. 553-554 (Bol.). Peru: COD. PROC. CIV. arts. 1156-1157
(Peru); COD. Civ. arts. 2102-2104 (Peru); see generally U. MONTOYA ALaERTI, supra note 19,
at 20-209. Chile: C6. Paoc. Civ. arts. 243-244 (Chile). Mexico: C.F.P.C. art. 606 (Mex.); COD.
PRoc. Civ. art. 1347-A (Mex.); Briseflo Sierra, supra note 15, at 105. Uruguay: COD. PROC.
Civ. art. 512 (Uru.). Venezuela: CO1). PROC. Civ. art. 850 (Venez.). In Argentina federal pro-
cedural law as applied by the federal courts, the courts of the federal capital, and the courts
of national territories, excludes reciprocity as a prerequisite to enforcement of foreign court
decisions and awards. This does not hold true for certain Argentine provincial procedural
codes. E.g., the Provinces of COrdoba, C6DIGO DE PROCEDIMmNTO CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA
PROVINCIA DR CORDORA arts. 984-985 (Argen.), and Santa Fe, CODIO DE PROCED[MIENTO
CIVIL Y CoMxRcIAL DR SANTA FE art. 270 (Argen.), require reciprocity as a precondition to
the recognition and enforcement of foreign court decisions and awards within their
territories.
150. See New York Convention, supra note 1, art.I(3); van den Berg, supra note 92, at
13-15.
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iprocity requirement. This requirement is often narrowly con-
strued by the courts in which enforcement of the foreign court de-
cision or arbitral award is sought." ' For the most part, Latin
American countries joining the New York Convention have ratified
international conventions regarding the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards without including the need for rec-
iprocity."5 2 Latin American courts have traditionally excluded reci-
procity requirements that might be contemplated in their
country's non-treaty legislation whenever international conven-
tions not recognizing this principle apply.5 3
Some Latin American courts also deny enforcement of ex
parte foreign awards against a domiciliary of the forum.5 " A strict
interpretation of this type of provision suggests that if the defend-
ant does not appear in the course of arbitral proceedings (even if
process was duly served on him), the award is not enforceable.
Countries having this type of provision, such as Brazil, will enforce
foreign ex parte awards against a local defendant only if he was
adequately notified of the existence of foreign arbitral proceeding,
was thereby given a fair opportunity to defend himself, and re-
ceived proper notice according to Brazilian law of the foreign con-
firmation proceedings. 55 A better solution would be to reflect this
principle in the existing legislation and eliminate the requirement
of the personal presence of the local defendant at the arbitral pro-
ceedings abroad. It should suffice that he was adequately notified
at both the commencement of arbitration and the confirmation
proceedings in order for the ensuing award to become enforceable.
A more troublesome problem is the Brazilian requirement that
the foreign award be homologated (confirmed) in the country
where it was made prior to its recognition and enforcement in Bra-
151. See G. PARRA ARANGUREN, LA FUNCI6N DE LA RECIPROCIDAD EN EL SISTEMA VENEZO-
LANO DEL EXEQUATUR 50-52 (1966).
152. See 1889 Montevideo Treaty, supra note 148, art. 5; 1940 Montevideo Treaty,
supra note 148, art. 2; Bolivian Treaty, supra note 148, art. 5; Bustamante Code, supra note
148, arts. 423, 432, Panama Convention, supra note 2, art. 5.
153. van der Berg, supra note 92, at 29-32.
154. Brazil: Marotta Rangel, supra note 15, at 44. Chile: C6D. Poc. Civ. art. 245(3)
(Chile). El Salvador. CODE Cvn. [C. Civ.] art. 452(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (El.
Sal.). In Argentina, the Provinces of Santa Fe (PROC. COD. art. 269(2)), C6rdoba (PROC. COD.
art. 986(2)), and Tucamin (PROC. COD. art. 589(2)) do not authorize the enforcement of ex
parte foreign decisions against defendants domiciled in Argentina.
155. de Magalhaes, supra note 29, at 91-93; Nattier, International Commercial Arbi-
tration in Latin America: Enforcement of Arbitral Agreements and Awards, 21 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 417 (1986); Samtleben, supra note 35, at 30 n.161.
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zil. This is tantamount to requiring that the arbitral award become
an executory instrument in the country where it was rendered
though enforcement is actually sought in Brazil.250
B. The Requirement of Res Judicata Effect
The laws of most Latin American countries, including Argen-
tina, normally only require that the foreign award be res judicata
in the country where it was rendered. Therefore, the local legisla-
tion of the country where the award is made determines if res judi-
cata has been reached. In this way, the parochial notions of finality
of the forum where enforcement is sought will not control. Con-
trary to this principle, however, an Argentine court erred in judg-
ing whether a foreign award rendered in Germany had attained res
156. C.P.C. art. 483 (Braz.); H. VALLADAO, 3 DmIrro INTERNACIONAL PrnvADo 217 (1978);
Rosenn, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Brazil, 28 Am. J. Comp. L. 498 (1980);
de Oliveira Novaes, Difficulties in Resolving Conflicts Regarding High Technology Con-
tracts in Brazil, 16 INTrrL Bus. L., 182 (1988). The present Brazilian pre-draft law on arbitra-
tion does not require "homologation" abroad (nor in Brazil) of the foreign award. However,
it has been pointed out that draft law provisions exempting the award from homologation
might be unconstitutional under the draft of the new Federal Constitution which would
require "homologation" in Brazil of foreign awards. M. Pose, 2 NEws AND NOTES FROM THE
INSTITUTE FOR TRANSITIONAL ARBITRATION 2 (1987). It has been argued, however, that under
article 20 of the draft Arbitration Law, the foreign award is not a court decision or judgment
in the sense of the federal constitution but just a "titulo ejecutivo extrajudicial." Conse-
quently, it is not subject to "homologation." Ermete de Oliveira, 3 NEws AND NOTES FROM
THE INSTITUTE OF TRANSNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2 (1988). Brazil: C.P.C. art. 247 (Braz.). Bo-
livia: C6D. PROC. Civ. arts. 557-558 (Bol.). Colombia: Diaz Rubio, supra note 15, at 69. Uru-
guay: C6D. PRoc. Civ. art. 516. Venezuela: C6D. PRoc. Civ. art. 850 (Venez.). The foreign
award is directly submitted to the Supreme Court for consideration. If the Supreme Court
homologates it, it will be sent for enforcement to the corresponding court. Marotta Rangel,
supra note 15, at 44. In Peru, the Superior Court with jurisdiction over respondent's domi-
cile decides whether exequatur shall be granted. U. MONTOYA ALBERTI, supra note 19, at
212-14. Oddly enough, on January 12, 1988, Mexico modified its Federal Code on Commer-
cial Procedure and incorporated a new article 570. It provides for the homologaci6n by a
Mexican court of arbitral awards rendered abroad whose enforcement is sought in Mexico,
unless provided otherwise by a treaty to which Mexico is a party. The procedure would
allow the party against whom enforcement is sought to raise defenses concerning the merits
of the foreign arbitral award. C6D. Com. art. 574. Though this provision cannot preempt
international conventions to which Mexico is a party (particularly the 1958 New York Con-
vention, since domestic awards do not need homolgacibn C.F.P.C. art. 632), its very existence
seems to strike a dissonant note in the otherwise promising prospects of international com-
mercial arbitration in Mexico. See Brisefto Sierra, El Actual Arbitroje Comercial, 9-10
PEM LRx-RE ISTA JURIDICA DE PETR6LEOS MEXICANOS, 10 (1989). It seems wiser simply to
interpret that by homologation, this provision merely refers to ordinary exequatur proceed-
ings in the course of which no revision on the merits is possible. See Siqueiros, La Coopera-
ci6n Procesal International, 19 JURIDICA ANALES DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE DERECHO DE LA
UNvERSmDAD IBERoAmERcANA 3, 17 (1988-89).
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judicata.115 Due to a mistaken reading of German legal provisions,
the court equated res judicata with executory effects of the award
in Germany. As a result, it wrongly held that the award could only
be res judicata in Germany after having obtained a leave of en-
forcement from a German court. In general, although res judicata
should be determined by the laws of the forum rendering the
award, the type of res judicata required should be assessed accord-
ing to the notions of forum law.
In continental law systems, there are two types of res judicata,
"formal" and "material." Formal res judicata occurs when there
are no available or pending appeals of the award nor any further
remedy to review the arbitral decision in the course of arbitral pro-
ceedings in which the award was rendered. In arbitral proceedings,
an appeal of the award filed in a state court is considered a contin-
uation of the existing proceedings. A separate action to set aside
the award, however, is not a continuation of existing arbitral pro-
ceedings and should be considered as an independent law suit hav-
ing its own individuality. Material res judicata exists when (i) the
award cannot be reviewed by appeal or otherwise in the same (ar-
bitral) proceedings where the decision was made, and (ii) it cannot
be reviewed in any other proceedings, including a separate action,
concerning the same subject matter and parties. 15
As far as Argentine law is concerned, I am of the view that
only formal res judicata should be required for foreign arbitral
awards. Furthermore, I believe that for enforcement purposes one
cannot require a greater degree of finality for foreign awards than
that required for local awards. As already indicated, a local award
in Argentina may be enforced as soon as it is made so long as it is
not subject to "suspensive" or "ordinary" means of recourse. It has
already been explained that an action to set aside or an "extraordi-
nary" means of recourse does not have "suspensive" effects.1"9
As a result, using Argentina as an example, I believe that a
judge confronted with the recognition or enforcement of a foreign
award has to look to the foreign law to determine two things: first,
if there are pending appeals in the same proceedings against the
award, and second, if such appeals exist, whether they have "sus-
pensive" effects. When there are no such pending appeals and no
157. Cim. Nac. Com., Sala "B," Schnabel, Gaumer & Co. v. Sepselon E., 41 E.D. 691
(with commentary by W. Goldschmidt).
158. C. COLOMBO, 1 C6DIGO PROCESAL CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NAC16N 294 (1975).
159. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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"suspensive" effects exist, the foreign award is res judicata and is
ready to be recognized and enforced in Argentina.'6 0
In view of the scarcity of Latin American decisions on this
topic, it is difficult to predict whether this approach is likely to
enjoy widespread acceptance. There is some evidence, however, of
a changing trend in this direction, as suggested by new article
1347-A(v) of the recently reformed Mexican Commercial Code. Ac-
cording to this provision, a foreign award is enforceable in Mexico
if it is either final or has the force of res judicata in the country
where rendered or no ordinary means of recourse is pending
against the award."'1
On the other hand, under present domestic Latin American
legislations as well as treaties on the recognition and enforcement
of foreign awards, the burden of proof rests on the party seeking
recognition or enforcement to show that the requirements therefor
have been met." 2 Thus, this party must bring evidence that res
judicata was attained in the foreign forum, that the defendant was
correctly notified, and in some cases, that the award was homolo-
gated by a local court in the country where it was rendered.1 6 3 All
these factors seem to indicate that many Latin American countries
160. This view has been favored for interpreting the 1911 Bolivian Treaty provisions on
enforcement of foreign court decisions and arbitral awards. G. PARRA ARANGUREN, El Acu-
erdo Boliviano Sobre Ejecucibn de Actos Extranjeros (1911) a la Luz de la Jurisprudencia
Venezolana, 22 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE D&RECHO UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA ANDRES BELLO
[REv. FAC. D.U.C.A.B.] 69-71 (1975-1976).
161. COD. COM. art. 1347-A (Mex.).
162. Article 6(c) of the 1889 and 1940 Montevideo Treaties on International Procedural
Law and article 6(d) of the 1911 Bolivian Treaty require that evidence must be presented in
the form of a court ruling showing that the foreign award is not subject to appeal or has
attained res judicata, and a copy of the laws on which such court decision is based must be
brought (duly authenticated) before the enforcement forum. See Montevideo Treaty, supra
note 148, art. 6(c). Article 3 of the 1979 Montevideo Convention has a similar requisite, but
in addition it requires the interested party to produce authentic copies of the documenta-
tion showing (i) that the defendant has been served process in the arbitral proceedings in a
manner substantially equivalent to the way such notices are made in the enforcement forum
and (ii) that the rights of the defendant have been respected during arbitral proceedings.
1979 Montevideo Treaty, supra note 148, art. 3.
163. That formal confirmation of the award (homologation) in the country where it was
rendered is a prerequisite for enforcement in a foreign forum is expressly established at
article 3 of the 1889 and 1940 Montevideo Treaties and of 1911 Bolivian Treaty and is
implicitly ratified by the requirement in these same treaties that the res judicata or binding
force of the award be confirmed by a court ruling of the country where it was made. G.
Parra Aranguren, supra note 151, at 50-51. This latter requirement is also set out at article
3(c) of the more recent 1979 Montevideo Convention, which suggests that the latter is
equally subordinating extraterritorial enforcement of arbitral awards to a sort of homologa-
tion in the country of origin.
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should seriously consider becoming parties to international con-
ventions which resolve some or all of the problems above.
C. Adherence to International Conventions
In fact, with few exceptions, the most important Latin Ameri-
can countries have become parties either to the 1958 New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards,'1 4 the 1975 Panama Inter-American Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration, 5 or the 1979 Montevideo
Inter-American Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Court Judgments and Arbitral Awards. The provisions
of the Panama Convention are almost a replica of article V of the
New York Convention. The Panama Convention, like the New
York Convention, also provides for the recognition of arbitral
agreements.16 6 Consequently, if a country such as Brazil accedes to
any of these conventions, it will be possible to obtain from a Bra-
zilian court specific performance of an arbitral agreement concern-
ing an international transaction, along with a stay of court pro-
ceedings. This is achieved by invoking the existence of an arbitral
agreement with a foreign party which has ratified or acceded to
any of these conventions. The Inter-American Conventions are
open to the signature and ratification to all countries belonging to
the Organization of American States (OAS). The United States has
recently become a party to the 1975 Panama Convention. 167 These
164. These include Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay. Peru ratified it in May 1988. See New York Convention,
supra note 1. Argentina signed the Convention on August 26, 1958 and ratified it through
Law 23619 of September 28, 1988, promulgated through Decree 1524/88 of October 21, 1988.
Official Bulletin No. 26501 of Nov. 4, 1988, 1-3. Grigera Na6n, Ratificaci6n par la Conven-
cibn de Nueva York de 1958, Sobre Reconocimiento y Ejecucibn de Laudos Arbitrales Ex-
tranjeros, L.L., May 17, 1989, at 1-5; Ratification by Argentina of the 1958 New York Con-
vention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 6 J. INT'L ARE. 121-
23 (1989). In the case of Colombia, a recent decision of the Colombian Supreme Court of
Justice declared the law ratifying the New York Convention unconstitutional on account of
a formal defect. Judgment of Oct. 6, 1988, Supreme Court of Justice, Colom., Carmen Ma-
rina Melo Torres, Decisi6n No. 108, File No. 1805, Oct, 6, 1988. This led Colombia to accede
to the New York Convention again through Law 39 of Nov. 20, 1990. Revista de Informaci6n
y Consulta No. 917, Dec. 30, 1990, at 691-93.
165. These include Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
166. See Panama Convention, supra note 2.
167. On the attitude of the U.S. with respect to the ratification of the 1975 Panama
Interamerican Convention, see Leich, The Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, 75 Am. J. INT'L L. 982 (1981). The U.S. bill to implement this Con-
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Conventions are also open to the accession of any country not be-
longing to the OAS. Nevertheless, no such accessions have taken
place so far.
The court decision granting or denying exequatur is normally
subject to the general means of recourse available to all trial deci-
sions of that country unless, as is often the case in many Latin
American countries, such decision is directly made by the Supreme
Court of Justice or higher courts and is thus not subject to further
challenge or review.168 In Argentina, such an appeal suspends the
enforcement of the award but the interested party may obtain in-
terim protective measures to ensure the enforcement of the
award. 16 9 If exequatur is granted through a final decision, the for-
eign award is equated with an Argentine award or court decision.
As such, it will have to go through the same enforcement proceed-
ings contemplated for both. In the course of such proceedings, only
limited defenses may be raised, such as payment, extension of the
term for payment, or remission of the debt occurring after the exe-
quatur order was obtained. No defense that could have been raised
in the course of exequatur proceedings may be presented at this
stage. The appeal against a ruling rejecting such defenses and or-
dering the public sale of the debtor's assets has suspensive effects,
unless the intervening court accepts suitable security from the
plaintiff.17 0 Exequatur proceedings are not required when the
party seeks only the recognition of res judicata effect but are re-
quired for enforcement of the foreign award. In such a case, recog-
nition will be granted by the court at the end of summary proceed-
ings, when it is shown that the award fulfills the same substantial
and formal requirements needed for its enforcement. 7 '
IV. CONCLUSION
This review of the present legislation on arbitration shows
that arbitration is a long-standing institution which is looked upon
vention was passed by Congress and was signed by President Bush on August 13, 1990. The
United States deposited the instrument of ratification on September 27, 1990. See Lowry,
The United States Joins the Inter-American Arbitration Convention, 7 J. INr'L Aaa. 83-90
(1990).
168. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
169. L. PALAcIo, 7 DEREcHo PRocEsAL CivEL 329 (1982); L. PALACIo, 5 DERECHO
PROCESAL Crvu 102 (1975). This is also the case in Mexico. C.F.P.C. art. 608 (Mex.).
170. C6D PRoc. Crv. Y CoM. arts. 499-516 (Argen.).
171. Id. art. 519.
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favorably in Latin America. Recent legislative changes are clearly
aimed at broadening the sphere of arbitrable matters and at up-
dating and improving procedural rules. This positive attitude of
Latin American countries during the last fifteen years has led to
the ratification of international conventions favoring arbitration, a
fact that certainly confirms this trend.
Though much remains to be done, there now exists a substan-
tial amount of information on Latin American arbitration as well
as growing experience in the field. This has led to the creation of a
positive intellectual environment for achieving the required
changes in the near future. It is expected that this educational
phenomenon will reduce the danger of ill-drafted arbitral agree-
ments, which are always disruptive, irrespective of the excellence
of the available legislation.17 2 Further it will facilitate the training
of' qualified Latin American arbitrators. This cultural change is
also likely to lead to the improvement of existing institutional ar-
bitration facilities and the creation of new ones which will attract
still more arbitrations.
A significant role in this regard has been, and will be, played
by Latin American chambers of commerce and similar organiza-
tions. Reference has already been made to pioneer legislation in
Ecuador in this sense. 17" In Argentina, both the Argentine Cham-
ber of Commerce and the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange have been
actively involved in the dissemination and implementation of com-
mercial arbitration. 7 4 The same may be said of the National
Chamber of Commerce of Mexico City. In Colombia, the commer-
cial code entrusts to local chambers of commerce the ex aequo et
bono conciliation and resolution of commercial disputes. A network
of local chambers of commerce led by the Bogotd Chamber of
Commerce seems to be extremely successful in the field of concilia-
tion and particularly active in the spreading of the utilization of
172. For example, the Argentine Supreme Court declared in Gas del Estado v.
E.T.P.M. y Otro that the Argentine federal courts are solely competent, in lieu of the ICC
Court of Arbitration, to appoint the members of an arbitral tribunal sitting in Argentina to
decide a dispute between an Argentine state entity and a foreign party under ICC Rules.
This conclusion was exclusively the consequence of an ill-drafted and obscure arbitral
clause. Judgment of July 28, 1983, C.J.N., Argen., 305-1 Fallos 9630. As a result of the de-
fects in the arbitral clause affecting the designation of the arbitrators by the ICC Court of
Arbitration, enforcement of the arbitral award was denied in France. Societ6 Gas del Es-
tado eISociktks Ecoftsa et E.TP.M., Cour d'appel de Paris (Re Ch. Suppl.), 4 REv. Ann. 683-
89 (1989).
173. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
174. Grigera Na6n, supra note 13, at 2.
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commercial arbitration. 75 In Venezuela, the Caracas Chamber of
Commerce has recently created a Conciliation and Arbitration
Center and provided it with its arbitration rules.1 76 Legislation in
Honduras allows reference to arbitration before the chambers of
industry and commerce in deciding on both international and do-
mestic commercial cases.1 7 The Chamber of Commerce of Lima,
Perfi is not only vested with powers to decide economic or com-
mercial disputes through ex aequo et bono arbitration, but can also
certify the existence, effectiveness, and substance of commercial
usage.178 The vital importance of these institutions fundamentally
resides in their direct and wide appeal to the users of commercial
arbitration, who are also their members.
The UNCITRAL Model Law on international commercial ar-
bitration is certainly a valuable guideline and source of inspiration
to move in that direction. Even its general adoption would not
jeopardize the essential public policy principles on arbitrability
and other vital areas that many Latin American countries feel nec-
essary to safeguard. 79 The mere incorporation of its guiding postu-
lates"80 would certainly dispel once and for all any remaining ap-
prehensions that winds hostile to arbitration are still blowing in
Latin America.
175. Montealegre Escobar, Los Arbitros en el Derecho Colombiano y en el Centro de
Arbitraje y Conciliacion Mercantiles de La Camara de Comercio de Bogota, in Liber
Amicorum Zubkowski, supra note 14, at 251, 260-63; Suarez Melo, El Arbitraje Comercial
en Colombia, in Liber Amicorum Zubkowski, supra note 14, at 273-75.
176. Normas Relativas al Centro de Conciliacibn y de Arbitraje de la Camara de Co-
mercio de Caracas (Caracas Chamber of Commerce Brochure) (Nov. 1989).
177. Lebn Gbmez, supra note 14, at 351-52.
178. Parodi Remon, El Arbitraje en el Peru, in Liber Amicorum Zubkowski, supra note
14, at 515-16. Parodi Remon also points out that one of the main aims of the federation of
chambers of commerce of the Andean Group (Confederaci6n de Camaras de Comercio del
Grupo Andino), as spelled out in its by-laws, is to act as international conciliation or arbitral
tribunals to resolve disputes between merchants belonging to countries of the Andean sub-
region (Bolivia, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador).
179. Article 1(5) of the Model Law provides that it "shall not affect any other law of
this state [the state adopting it) by virtue of which certain disputes may not be submitted to
arbitration only according to provisions other than those of this law." This provision was
proposed by the Soviet delegate with the immediate support or approval of the Australian,
French, U.K., U.S., Hungarian, and Cuban representatives. UNCITRAL, 18th Sess., Sum-
mary Records of the 305th to 333rd Mtgs., at 19-21, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SR. 305-33 (1985);
Grigera Na6n, La Ley Modelo de la CNUDMI Sabre Arbitraje Comercial Internacional y el
Derecho Argentina, L.L., Feb. 13-14, 1989, 3-4.
180. Garro, The UNCITRAL Model Law and the 1988 Spanish Arbitration Act: Mod-
els For Reform In Central America, 1 Am. Rzv. INT'L ARM 201-04 (1990).
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